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THE CONGRESSIONAL INVITATION TO AVOID 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING: AN ANALYSIS 
OF SECTION 303 OF THE FEDERAL 
MAGISTRATES ACT OF 1968t 
Patricia W. Weinberg* and Robert L. Weinberg** 
I. THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES Ac:r OF 1968 
AT the bill-signing ceremony for the new Federal Magistrates Act1 on October 17, 1968, President Johnson declared: 
The Act that I will sign today achieves a long-overdue reform in 
the Federal judicial system. It replaces the United States Commis-
sioners with the office of the United States Magistrates. 
But more than a name change is involved in this Act .... [I]t will 
bring new standards of professionalism and a much higher quality 
of justice to an important first level of our judiciary. 
Later in his remarks he added, "The Act also improves the law re-
lating to preliminary hearings of accused persons."2 We take issue 
only with the latter claim. For, ironically, this "reform" legislation, 
which gives magistrates important new duties and insures that they 
are better qualified to handle them, 8 also threatens to curtail the 
performance of one of their most important former duties in safe-
guarding the accused: the holding of preliminary hearings under 
rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 
The provision that assertedly "improves the law relating to 
preliminary hearings"5 appears in section 303(a) of the Act, as an 
t Some of the research for this Article was undertaken in connection with the 
current study of the preliminary hearing in four American jurisdictions (Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.) and in England by the Institute of 
Criminal Law and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center. The research as-
sistance to the Institute of law students, in particular Richard Wood and Lenore 
Schreiber, has contributed to the materials for this Article. The authors' views are 
their own, however, and do not necessarily represent those of the Institute. 
• Member of the District of Columbia and Connecticut bars; Senior Research At-
torney and Project Director of Preliminary Hearing Study, Institute of Criminal Law 
and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S. 1956, London School of Eco-
nomics; LL.B. 1960, Yale University.-Ed. 
•• Member of the District of Columbia and Connecticut bars; visiting lecturer 
in criminal procedure, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A. 1953, LL.B. 1960, 
Yale University; Ph.D. 1960, London School of Economics.-Ed. 
1. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified in 18, 28 U.S.C.). 
2. Remarks of the President upon signing S. 945, Federal Magistrates Act, Oct. 17, 
1968 (Office of the White House Press Secretary). 
3. See note 106 infra. 
4. See note 8 infra. 
5. Remarks of the President, supra note 2. The terms "preliminary examination" 
and "preliminary hearing" are used interchangeably in this Article. 
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amendment to section 3060 of title 18 of the United States Code. 
The amendment specifies that unless the preliminary hearing is 
waived by the defendant or postponed with his consent it "shall 
be held within a reasonable time following initial appearance" of 
the accused before the magistrate, but no later than the tenth day 
after the initial appearance if the defendant is in custody or the 
twentieth day if the defendant has been released. 6 Prior to this 
amendment, section 3060 was merely a cross-reference to rule 5 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.7 Rule 5 provides8 
6. Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 303(a), 82 Stat. 1117 (1968): 
Section 3060, title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows: 
"§ 3060. Preliminary examination 
"(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, a preliminary examination 
shall be held within the time set by the judge or magistrate pursuant to subsec-
tion (b) of this section, to determine whether there is probable cause to believe 
that an offense has been committed and that the arrested person has committed it. 
"(b) The date for the preliminary examination shall be fixed by the judge or 
magistrate at the initial appearance of the arrested person. Except as provided by 
subsection (c) of this section, or unless the arrested person waives the preliminary 
examination, such examination shall be held within a reasonable time following 
initial appearance, but in any event not later than-
"(l) the tenth day following the date of the initial appearance of the arrested 
person before such officer if the arrested person is held in custody without any 
provision for release, or is held in custody for failure to meet the conditions of 
release imposed, or is released from custody only during specified hours of the 
day;.(~r the twentieth day following the date of the initial appearance if the 
arrested person is released from custody under any condition other than a condi-
tion described in paragraph (1) of this subsection. 
"(c) With the consent of the arrested person, the date fixed by the judge or 
magistrate for the preliminary examination may be a date later than that pre-
scribed by subsection (b), or may be continued one or more times to a date subse• 
quent to the date initially fixed therefor. In the absence of such consent of the 
accused, the date fixed for the preliminary hearing may be a date later than that 
prescribed by subsection (b), or may be continued to a date subsequent to the date 
mitially fixed therefor, only upon the order of a judge of the appropriate United 
States district court after a finding that extraordinary circumstances exist, and 
that the delay of the preliminary hearing is indispensable to the interests of justice. 
"(d) Except as provided by subsection (e) of this section, an arrested person 
who has not been accorded the preliminary examination required by subsection 
(a) within the period of time fixed by the judge or magistrate in compliance with 
subsections (b) and (c), shall be discharged from custody or from the requirement 
of bail or any other condition of release, without prejudice, however, to the insti-
tution of further criminal proceedings against him upon the charge upon which 
he was arrested. 
"(e) No preliminary examination in compliance with subsection (a) of this 
section shall be required to be accorded an arrested person, nor shall such arrested 
person be discharged from custody or from the requirement of bail or any other 
condition of release pursuant to subsection (d), if at any time subsequent to the 
initial appearance of such person before a judge or magistrate and prior to the 
date fixed for the preliminary examination pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) an 
indictment is returned or, in appropriate cases, an information is filed against such 
person in a court of the United States. 
"(f) Proceedings before United States magistrates under this section shall be 
taken down by a court reporter or recorded by suitable sound recording equip• 
ment. A copy of the record of such proceeding shall be made available at the 
expense of the United States to a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to 
pay or give security therefor, and the expense of such copy shall be paid by the 
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts." 
7. In its entirety, section 3060 had read: "§ 3060. Preliminary Examination-
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that a defendant arrested prior to indictment should be brought 
before a committing magistrate, there informed of his rights, and 
"within a reasonable time" afforded a preliminary hearing to deter-
mine whether there was probable cause to detain him pending grand 
jury consideration9 of his case. 
If section 303 had simply prescribed the ten- and twenty-day 
limits for nonconsensual continuances of the hearing date, it would 
have added needed specificity to the "reasonable time" requirement 
of rule 5(c). But section 303 goes on to provide that "[n]o prelimi-
nary examination : . . shall be required to be accorded an arrested 
person ... if at any time subsequent to the initial appearance of 
such person . . . and prior to the date fixed for the preliminary 
examination ... an indictment is returned .... "10 Instead of 
"improv[ing] the law relating to preliminary hearings of accused 
persons," this provision offers the well-organized prosecutor's office 
an invitation to avoid a preliminary hearing altogether. Senator 
(Rule) SEE FEDERAL Rur.Es OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Proceedings before commissioner, 
appearance, advice as to right to counsel, bearing, Rule 5." Act of June 25, 1948, 
ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 819. 
8. Rule 5 reads: 
(a) .APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COIIIMISSIONER. An officer making an arrest under a 
warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a war-
rant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest 
available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit 
persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States. When a person 
arrested without a warrant is brought before a commissioner or other officer, a 
complaint shall be filed forthwith. 
(b) STATEMENT BY THE CoM?.nssroNER. The commissioner shall inform the de-
fendant of the complaint against him and of any affidavit filed therewith, of his 
right to retain counsel, of his right to request the assignment of counsel if he is 
unable to obtain counsel, and of his right to have a preliminary examination. He 
shall also inform the defendant that he is not required to make a statement and 
that any statement made by him may be used against him. The commissioner shall 
allow the defendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel and shall 
admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules. 
(c) PRELIMINARY ExAMINATION. The defendant shall not be called upon to plead. 
If the defendant waives preliminary examination, the commissioner shall forthwith 
hold him to answer in the district court. If the defendant does not waive examina-
tion, the commissioner shall hear the evidence within a reasonable time. The 
defendant may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in 
his own behalf. If from the evidence it appears to the commissioner that there is 
probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the de-
fendant has committed it, the commissioner shall forthwith hold him to answer in 
the district court; otherwise the commissioner shall discharge him. The commis-
sioner shall admit the defendant to bail as provided in these rules. After con-
cluding the proceeding the commissioner shall transmit forthwith to the clerk of 
the district court all papers in the proceeding and any bail taken by him. 
For a discussion of the effect of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 on rule 5, see 
pt. III. C. infra. 
9. If the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor, or if he waives grand jury 
indictment, grand jury consideration is not required and the prosecutor may instead 
file an information. Fm. R. CRIM. P. 7(a). 
IO. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3060(e) (Supp. Feb. 1969). This section is quoted in note 6 
supra. 
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Tydings, the sponsor and architect of the Act, recognized this pos-
sibility, and predicted that "[t]he ultimate result in our busy urban 
districts may be the virtual elimination of preliminary hearings, but 
only if the present grand jury delays are eliminated first."11 
Under prior law, it is true, many federal prosecutors routinely 
avoided preliminary hearings by securing continuances of the 
hearing date until after an indictment was obtained.12 But this ploy 
required a complaisant magistrate or an inert defendant. Moreover, 
the propriety of using continuances to circumvent the accused's 
right to a preliminary hearing had come under increasing and some-
times successful attack.13 Section 303, if literally construed, can 
legitimize the prosecutorial practice of mooting the defendant's right 
to a preliminary hearing under rule 5(c) by obtaining a relatively 
quick indictment.14 This predictable use or abuse of the Act should 
and can be prevented, we submit, either by a judicial construction 
of section 303 that preserves the defendant's right to a prompt pre-
liminary hearing,15 or by provision for alternative forms of dis-
covery16 that would reduce the prosecutor's motivation for avoiding 
the hearing. 
11. Remarks on the floor of the Senate, Feb. 8, 1967, reprinted in Hearings on 
S. J,475 b S. 945 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) 
at 241 [hereinafter Hearings on S. J,475]. Compare the opinions on this point in two 
staff memoranda prepared to accompany draft legislation. Staff Memorandum, April 28, 
1966, in Hearings on S. J,475, at 9, 15: "[I]t is anticipated that preliminary hearings 
will rarely be held." Staff Memorandum, June 7, 1966, Hearings on S. J,475, at 29, 86: 
It is anticipated that this procedure will, at least initially, increase the frequency 
of preliminary hearings in districts in which the gran,l jury backlog is such that no 
action can be expected within a short time after arrest and presentment. It will 
also provide something of an incentive for prompt grand jury action, in that a 
prosecutor who wishes to avoid a preliminary hearing can do so only by getting 
his case to the grand jury quickly. 
12. See S. REP. No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1967) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 371]; 
Remarks of Senator Tydings on the floor of the Senate, Feb. 8, 1967, in Hearings on 
S. J,475, at 237, 241; Hearings on the United States Commissioner System Before the 
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 14 (1965) (testimony of Prof. Charles A. Lind-
quist of Temple University) [hereinafter Hearings, pt. I]; Hearings on the United 
States Commissioner System Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Ma-
chinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., r,t. 3, at 220-22, 
254-55 (1966) (testimony of Irving Younger of New York University and Judge Talbot 
Smith of the Eastern Dist. of Michigan) [hereinafter Hearings, pt. 3]. 
13. See text accompanying note 71 infra. 
14. See note 12 supra. The practice had been criticized in hearings on the legisla• 
tion. Hearings, pt. I, at 14 (testimony of Prof. Charles A. Lindquist); Hearings, pt. 3, 
at 220-22 (testimony of Prof. Irving Younger). As to indictment mooting the hearing, 
see text accompanying notes 69-74 infra. 
15. See text accompanying notes 131-39 infra. 
16. See text accompanying notes 154-66 infra. 
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II. FUNCTIONS OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
UNDER PRIOR LAW 
A. Historical Perspective 
I. Early English and American Uses 
1365 
Contemporary debate on the preliminary hearing has largely 
focused upon whether the hearing's sole purpose is to determine the 
existence of probable cause to hold the accused, or whether the 
hearing has the additional purpose of affording the defendant an 
opportunity for discovery.17 Today either function is assumed to be 
primarily for the defendant's benefit. The weight of judicial author-
ity recognizes only the former purpose; as the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in 1967, "[i]t is quite clear 
from the logic as well as the history of the procedure that discovery 
is not one of its purposes."18 The draftmen of the Federal Magis-
trates Act clearly shared this assumption: "Your committee believes 
that a judicial determination of the question of probable cause for 
the accused's restraint is the historic purpose of a preliminary exami-
nation, and that in light of certain current practices it is necessary 
to spell out that purpose .... "19 
But in its origin, in sixteenth century English law, the pre-
liminary hearing was designed primarily to serve the purpose of 
discovery-and to do so for the benefit of the prosecution. The 
first preliminary hearing statute,20 which was enacted in 1554, pro-
vided that nvo justices of the peace were to examine prisoners before 
they were admitted to bail, to hear the testimony of those who 
charged them, and to record the information thus disclosed. This 
significant development in criminal procedure came about "appar-
ently by accident, for the motive of the enactment was, it seems, to 
prevent collusion between justices and criminals" in releasing 
defendants on bail.21 A statute enacted in the following year ex-
17. See text accompanying notes 47-68 infra. 
18. Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 
906 (1968). The court noted that "[t]here is extensive authority in the cases for the 
proposition that the return of an indictment, which establishes probable cause, 
eliminates the need for a preliminary examination." 385 F .2d at 133. It declined to 
order a post-indictment preliminary hearing. 
19. S. REP. No. 371, at 33. However, a committee staff memorandum noted the 
other historical purposes of the preliminary hearing. Hearings on S. 3,475, at 268, 271. 
20. l &: 2 Phil. &: M., c. 13 (1554). 
21. T. PLUCKNEIT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 432 (5th ed, 1956); l 
J. SrEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 219, 236-38 (1883). See also 
M. DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE 53 (1727 ed.): 
[Under the prior practice, a single justice] did oftentimes by sinister Means set at 
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tended the examination procedure to cases in which the prisoner was 
not bailed but committed, 22 and soon "it became apparent that an 
important novelty had been introduced, albeit obliquely, into crimi-
nal procedure."23 Under the statute, "all arrested persons were to be 
brought before the magistrate and to be examined by him. He would 
then try to discover what evidence he could against the accused and 
see to it that that evidence was not lost."24 The preliminary examina-
tion thus came to serve a vital discovery function for the prosecution 
at a time when there was neither a police force nor a public prose-
cutor.25 
The magistrate's investigatory duties later began to decline, 
about the same time as the first professional police force was estab-
lished. 26 The requirement that the accused be examined at prelim-
inary hearing was finally abolished in England in 1848.27 By contrast 
large great Offenders, such as were not bailable, and yet, to hide their Affection 
therein, did signify the Cause of their Apprehension to be but only for Suspicion 
of Felony, whereby the said Offenders have escaped unpunished; for Reformation 
thereof, by the Statute 1 b 2 P. b M. it was enacted, That if it be for Man-
slaughter, or Felony, or Suspicion of Manslaughter, or Felony, (being bailable by 
Law,) then the same Justices must be present together at the Time of the said 
Bailment; and that they must certify (in Writing subscribed with their own Hands) 
the said Bailment at the next General Gaol-delivery, to be holden within the 
County where the Person shall be arrested or suspected, upon Pain to be fined by 
the Justices of Gaol-delivery. 
22. 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555). 
23. T. PLUCKNE'IT, supra note 21, at 432. The statutes are reprinted in A. KlRALFY, 
A SOURCE BOOK OF ENGLISH I.Aw 5-7 (1957). 
24. E. PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 91 (1953). For a historical 
and analytical treatment of practices under the early legislation, I & 2 Phil. & M., 
c. 13 (1554), 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555), see 4 w. HOLDSWORTH, A HISI'ORY OF EN• 
GLISH I.Aw 528-30 (2d ed. 1937); 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 21, at 219-28. See also M. 
DALTON, supra note 21, at 105-08, 539-48. 
25. See E. PUTTKAJ\r:MER, supra note 24, at 88: 
The statute [of Philip and Mary] was the reflection of the fact that at that time 
(and indeed for close to another three hundred years) there was no organized 
governmental agency faced with the task of prosecuting criminals. There was no 
prosecuting attorney in England at that time, and, from the standpoint of the 
preliminary examination even more significant, there was no police force. There 
was literally no participation on the part of government in the criminal pro-
ceedings at this stage. This necessarily operated very largely to the benefit of 
undeserving persons, because it might be possible to do away with incriminating 
evidence, or the gathering of evidence might not begin until it was too late. 
See also Devlin, The Police in a Changing Society, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 123, 125 
(1966). 
26. In England, this was in 1829. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 21, at 432. According 
to Holdsworth, 
as late as 1823 it was stated to the grand jury that, when a magistrate was 
conducting this preliminary examination, he was acting inquisitorially and not 
judicially; that such proceedings might and ought to be conducted in secret; and 
that information so ascertained might be communicated to the prosecutor but not 
to the party accused. 
I W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH I.Aw 296 (7th ed. 1956). 
27. Sir John Jervis' Act, 11 & 12 Viet., c. 42 (1848). Shortly thereafter by the Act of 
30 & 31 Viet., c. 35 (1867), the defendant was allowed to call witnesses at the prelimi-
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to the important role that discovery played in the early preliminary 
examinations, the screening function was more limited than at 
present. The rule as stated by Hale was: "If a person be brought 
before a Justice, if it appears no Felony be committed, he may dis-
charge him; but if a Felony be committed, though it appears not that 
the party accused is guilty, yet he cannot discharge him, but must 
commit or bail him."28 
The basic English preliminary examination statutes were in ef-
fect in this country both before and after the Revolution;29 as in 
England, the examination served the purpose of discovery for the 
prosecution.80 But some states rejected or limited the English 
preliminary examination statutes because of their incompatibility 
with constitutional provisions securing the privilege against self-
incrimination. 31 As Justice Rutledge has pointed out: 
nary hearing. For a discussion of the legislation, see 1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 21, at 
220-29. It seems likely that there was a shift in emphasis of the preliminary hearing 
away from requiring the accused to make a statement even before the adoption of the 
statute. See ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 39, Commentary, at 266 (Official Draft 
1930); P, DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 6-8 (1958); T. PLUCKNETI', 
supra note 21, at 432; Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy 
for the Third Degree, 30 MrcH. L. REY, 1224, 1233-35 (1932). 
28. M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 98 (1682 ed.). 
29. Kauper, supra note 27, at 1235-36. During the colonial period, the statutory as 
well as the common law of England was generally in effect unless it conflicted with an 
enactment of a colonial assembly. See Note, Law in Colonial New York: The Legal 
System in 1691, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1757, 1769 (1967). The statutes of Philip and Mary 
are cited as authority in numerous early legal treatises. See, e.g., BURN's .ABRIDGMENT, 
OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE 141 (1792); CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, OR THE OFFICE, Durr, AND 
AUTHORITY OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 82 (1722); J. LATROBE, THE JUSTICE'S PRACTICE 
UNDER THE LAws OF MARYLAND 317 (2d ed. 1835); G. WEBB, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY 
OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 31, 140 (1736). 
ll0. See J. GOEBEL &: T. NAUGHroN, LAw ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW You 
630-llll (1944). 
31. The privilege against self-incrimination had received early acceptance in this 
country. See generally Rogge, Book Review, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 862 (1969). It has been 
nid that it "came to be fairly well established in the New England colonies before 
1650 and in Virginia shortly thereafter." Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional 
History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763, 781 
(19ll5). By 1789 the privilege was included in the constitutions or bills of rights of 
seven states. Id. at 764-65. State constitutional provisions, including the privilege 
against self-incrimination, were generally cited in the early justice of the peace man-
uals. See J. CoLVIN, MAGISTRATE'S GUIDE AND CITIZEN'S COUNSELLOR 238 (1805) (citing 
the Maryland provision that "no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against 
himself"); H. POTTER, THE OFFICE AND DUTY OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 350 (1816) 
[quoting N, C. CONST, art. VII (1776)]. Massachusetts adopted its own committal 
statute as early as 1783. D. DAVIS, A PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE AUTHORITY AND 
DUTY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 26 (1824). The author states 
that the provisions of the statutes of Philip and Mary had not been adopted by the 
state. Id. at 90-91. Even though a defendant might be called upon to plead under the 
statute "[w]hen the party is brought before the magistrate, he ought to be cautioned, 
that he is not bound either to accuse himself, or confess his guilt; and that any con-
fession or admission of that. nature may be produced in evidence against him on his 
trial." Id. at 107. 
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Historically it was the preliminary inquisition which gave rise to 
the privilege. It was won through centuries of struggle against abuses 
of magisterial as well as more formal judicial inquisition. The 
modern hearing is the lineal descendant of the ancient preliminary 
examination. But its character has changed with the evolution of 
the privilege and other constitutional guaranties.a2 
The shift away from requiring the accused to testify at prelimi-
nary hearing was accompanied by increasing opportunities for the 
defense to gain positive advantages at the hearing. Gradually the ac-
cused obtained the right to be present at the hearing and to be 
accompanied by counsel,33 to cross-examine witnesses against him,34 
In South Carolina, the statutes of Philip and Mary remained in effect until 1839, 
when the legislature passed its own committal statute, indirectly repealing the English 
predecessor. See In Te Bates, 2 F. Cas. 1015, 1017 (No. 1,099a) (D.S.C. 1858); B. PRESSLEY, 
THE LAW OF MAGISTRATES AND CoNsrABLES IN THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROUNA 208 (1848). 
The new statute provided that the defendant need no longer be examined at the 
preliminary hearing-a regrettable deviation from former practice, according to a 
contemporary commentator: 
Though by the Act of 1839, it is no longer obligatory on the magistrate to examine 
the prisoner, yet it were better that this ancient and established course be pursued 
as the hearing of what the prisoner may say for and against himself, will probably 
furnish useful information in the investigation of the case. 
Id. See also H. HITCHCOCK, THE ALABAMA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 98 (1822), emphasizing 
that the English statutes of Philip and Mary are "not in force in this country, [and) 
the trial of a criminal in this state must be governed by the rules of the common law, 
and our own act of Assembly; neither of which will justify his own examination in 
order to convict him." The magistrate was authorized "to take the voluntary informa-
tion of the accused." Id. at 205 (emphasis added). The privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was contained in the first Alabama Constitution, art. 1, § 10 (1819). 
Id. at 473. 
32, Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (footnote omitted). 
The court reversed the conviction because the accused's plea of guilty at the prelimi-
nary hearing had been admitted into evidence at trial, and noted that the right to 
examine the defendant at preliminary hearing does not entail 
authority to compel him to answer, with the sanction of contempt, or to do so 
in any manner which would violate constitutional right • • • • The power of 
examination, therefore, goes no further than is constitutionally permissible in a 
judicial proceeding. Nor should the hearing be made a trap for luring the unwary 
into confession or admission which is fatal or prejudicial. So to use it would 
pervert its function and make of the court, not an arbiter, but an arm of the 
prosecution. This could bring back the very evil the privilege was created to 
destroy. 
128 F.2d at 271. 
33. See J. BENEDicr, BENEDICT'S TREATISE: CONTAINING A SUMMARY OF THE JURIS• 
DICTION POWERS AND DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
278-79 (1846); T. WATERMAN, THE JUSTICE'S MANUAL; OR, A SUMMARY OF THE POWERS 
AND DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN TIIE STATE OF NEW YORK 206 (2d ed. 1825), 
But see In Te Bates, 2 F. Cas. 1015, 1017 (No. 1,099a) (D.S.C. 1858) ("While it was 
professed to confront the accused and the witnesses, and allow the benefits of cross-
examination, in practice the right of counsel for the accused to be present as a matter 
of right was denied.'). 
There may have been mixed motives for allowing the defendant to be present. See 
J. GOEBEL 8i: T. NAUGHTON, supra note 30, at 33-34: the right to confrontation at the 
preliminary examination "probably developed during the early eighteenth century, 
chiefly because it was a convenient way to wrest a confession from a prisoner," 
34. H. HrrCHcocK, THE ALABAMA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 205 (1822). But the right to 
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and to call witnesses in his own behalf.35 In comparison to the earlier 
American practice,36 the screening standard became higher: the 
accused was entitled to discharge unless it had been shown that there 
was probable cause that he had committed the offense.37 By 1824 the 
Solicitor General of Massachusetts was able to write that the prelim-
inary examination "has been considered rather as a privilege in fa. 
vour of the party accused, afforded by law for the benefit of an 
innocent man, who may by this opportunity have it in his power to 
cross-examination did not exist in colonial New York. J. GoEBEL &: T. NAUGHTON, supra 
note 30, at 635. 
35. J. BENEDICT, supra note 33, at 279; D. DAVIS, A PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE 
AUTHORITY AND DUTY OF JusnCES OF THE PEACE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 112 (1824); 
J. LATROBE, supra note 29, at 317; T. WATERMAN, supra note 33, at 205; G. WEBB, supra 
note 29, at 112. J. GOEBEL&: T. NAUGHTON, supra note 30, at 633, without citing author• 
ity, state that "[t]he justice's manuals usually contained an admonition that evidence 
which went against the Crown should be taken as well as that which was against the 
defendant," 
36. See BuRN's ABRIDGMENT, supra note 29, at 156: 
If a felony is committed, and one is brought before a justice upon suspicion 
thereof, and the justice finds upon examination that the prisoner is not guilty; 
yet the justice shall not discharge him, but he must either be bailed or committed: 
For it is not fit that a man once arrested and charged with felony, or suspicion 
thereof, should be delivered upon any man's discretion, without further trial. 
See also id. at 64-65, 98; H. HITCHCOCK, supra note 34, at 204; G. WEBB, supra note 29, 
at 140. The language in each of the three treatises cited is almost identical. 
37. See J. BENEDICT, BENEDICT'S TREATISE: CONTAINING A SUMMARY OF THE JURIS· 
DICfION, POWERS AND DUTIES OF JusnCES OF THE PEACE IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 471 
(3d ed. 1852): 
If, upon the examination of the whole matter, it appears to the magistrate either 
that no offence has been committed by any person, or that there is no probable 
cause for charging the prisoner therewith, he must discharge him. 
It appears formerly to have been held, and upon high authority, that if there 
were an express charge of felony, on oath, against the prisoner, the magistrate had 
no discretion to discharge, but must bail or commit him. But this position has 
been controverted by all recent authorities, and cannot be considered as the law 
at the present day. For it has been well observed, that according to this doctrine, 
the liberty and character of every man in the country would be placed at the 
mercy, not of the magistrate, (for he is assumed to have no discretion,) but at 
the mercy of any corrupt and infamous individual, who might think proper to 
make a positive oath that a felony had been committed by the person whom he 
accused-a doctrine too monstrous to be stated as law. 
(The 1846 edition of this work, supra note 33, at 280, is in accord with the first para-
graph of the above quotation but lacks the commentary contained in the second 
paragraph.) Accord, T. WATERMAN, supra note 33, at 207; cf. D. DAVIS, supra note 35, 
at 112; H. POTIER, THE OFFICE AND Durr OF A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 60 (1816) ("The 
justice should discharge persons brought before him charged with any crime, if upon 
inquiry it manifestly appears either that no crime was committed, or that the suspicion 
entertained of the prisoner was wholly groundless: otherwise he must be committed 
to prison or give bail,"). See also J. LATROBE, supra note 29, at 317: 
If there be an express charge of felony, on oath, against the prisoner, though his 
guilt appear doubtful, the justice cannot wholly discharge him, but must bail or 
commit him • • • • And, in modem practices, though exculpatory evidence is re• 
ceived at the instance of the prisoner, and certified with the other depositions, 
unless it appear in the clearest manner that the charge is malicious, as well as 
groundless, it is not usual for the magistrate to discharge him, even when he 
believes him to be altogether innocent. 
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clear himself from suspicion. "38 The same source also recognized the 
possibility of using testimony taken at the preliminary hearing for 
impeachment at trial39-a principal object of contemporary defense 
counsel who use the preliminary hearing for discovery.40 
2. Rule 5(c) Prior to the Magistrates Act 
From 1789 until the adoption of Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure in 1946, the preliminary hearing in federal practice followed, 
in large measure, the practice of the state in which the federal court 
was sitting.41 The federal provision adopted as rule 5(c), which was 
thought to reflect prevailing state practice,42 reads: 
38. D. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 92. The same language, though different grammar, 
is to be found in J. BENEDICT, supra note 33, at 469, where it is added: "And it being 
for the benefit of the accused, he has a right to insist upon an examination taking 
place, before he can be compelled to enter into a recognizance." 
39. D. DAVIS, supra note 35, at 94: 
In Massachusetts, it is not the usual practice to take the testimony of the com• 
plainant and witnesses in writing. It is sometimes done in capital cases, and in 
other cases in which a particular interest is taken or existed; but such written 
testimony is not made use of on the trial unless by the consent of the prisoner; 
though it undoubtedly may be, to contradict or impeach the testimony of a witness 
when material varies, or is repugnant to what he swore to before the magistrate. 
J. GOEBEL&: T. NAUGHTON, supra note 30, at 636, cite "one important case [in which] it 
had been ruled that examinations could be read at the defendant's request to impeach 
the credibility of a witness." The preliminary hearing's change from a discovery tool 
for the prosecution to a discovery tool for the defense is explained clearly and accu• 
rately, though with little documentation, in E. PUITKAMMER, supra note 24, at 88-95. 
40. See E. BARRETI PRETIYMAN FELLOWS, 1965-1966, THE PRELIMINARY HEARING IN 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 7-8 (1967) (footnote omitted): 
There is currently a judicial dispute as to whether discovery is another recognized 
purpose of a preliminary hearing. From the perspective of the defense counsel, 
however, there is no doubt that the hearing is a critical tool in trial preparation. 
If used properly, the crucial facts of the government's case, including names of 
potential witnesses, statements made by the defendant, and physical evidence in 
the government's possession, can be discovered. Moreover, since the hearing is 
transcribed or recorded, the testimony is preserved for potential trial use in re-
freshing recollection or impeachment. For these reasons, preliminary hearings 
SHOULD NEVER BE WAIVED. 
41. The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 91 (emphasis added) provided: 
That for any crime or offence against the United States, the offender may, by any 
justice or judge of the United States, or by any justice of the peace, or other 
magistrate of any of the United States where he may be found agre, !.bly to the 
usual mode of process against off enders in such state • • • be arrested, and im-
prisoned or bailed as the case may be, for trial • • . . 
By this directive, preliminary proceedings in federal criminal cases were to be governed 
by the law of the state in which the court was sitting. See In re Bates, 2 F. Cas. 1015, 
1017 (No. 1,099a) (D.S.C. 1858): 
In the United States there is no law by which an established mode of criminal 
procedure is provided, and an uniform system of practice pursued. In the criminal 
as in the civil administration of justice, legislation, as far as it has gone, has 
professed to assimilate in each state the practice of the courts of the United States 
with that of the highest courts of law in that state. 
See also United States v. Horton, 26 F. Cas. 375 (No. 15,393) (C.C. Mo. 1873), and the 
discussion and authorities in L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER THE FEDERAL 
RULES 228-30 (1966). Orfield concludes that "the great bulk of the cases held that state 
law was applicable to almost every aspect of the preliminary examination in the federal 
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The defendant shall not be called upon to plead. If the defendant 
waives preliminary examination, the commissioner shall forthwith 
hold him to answer in the district court. If the defendant does not 
waive examination, the commissioner shall hear the evidence within 
a reasonable time. The defendant may cross-examine witnesses 
against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf. If from 
the evidence it appears to the commissioner that there is probable 
cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it, the commissioner shall forthwith hold 
him to answer in the district court; otherwise the commissioner shall 
discharge him .... 
Rule 5(c) is silent as to the nature and strength of the evidence. 
needed to establish probable cause. And, although the rules else-
where provide that the defendant may waive indictment, 43 they fail 
to indicate whether a defendant who is within the ambit of rule 
5(c)44 can be deprived of the hearing by return of an indictment 
before the hearing is held. 
The practical result under rule 5(c), as the draftsmen of the new 
Magistrates Act found, was that "[£Jew commissioners have any clear 
idea of what the contours and purposes of the preliminary hearing 
are. Much of this confusion is pardonable, since the law with respect 
to the preliminary hearing is in dire need of clarification."45 In 
adopting the Federal Magistrates Act, Congress did at least clarify 
courts prior to the adoption of Rule 5," although he cites a few cases to the contrary. 
Id. at 231 nn. 1, 2, 6. 
Later federal statutes, e.g., Act to Suppliment the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 
5 Stat. 516 (1842), Appropriations Act, 29 Stat. 184 (1896), provided for the 
appointment of federal committing magistrates, but the obligation to follow state 
procedure remained. It was not until 1940 that legislation was approved authorizing 
the Supreme Court to regulate criminal procedure in the federal courts. 54 Stat. 688, 
now 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1964). The rules were promulgated by the Supreme Court at 
the end of 1944 and took effect on March 21, 1946. Holtzoff, A Criminal Case in the 
Federal Courts, in 1966 FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3 (West ed.). Rule 5 
has been said to be "largely a codification of pre-existing practice, except that it 
eliminates pleas before committing magistrates, which were in fact an anomaly." Id. 
at 5. For a discussion of early drafts of rule 5, see L. ORFIELD, supra, at 203-15. The 
best compilation of state law governing the preliminary hearing prior to the adoption 
of rule 5 is contained in ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 39-60, Commentary, 
at 266-334 (Official Draft 1930). 
42. F.ED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a), Advisory Committee Note 2. For a discussion of the effect 
of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 on rule 5, see pt. III. C. infra. 
43. F.ED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b). 
44. Rule 5(c) applies only to a defendant who has been arrested or summoned 
prior to the return of an indictment. See United States v. Shields, 291 F.2d 798, 799 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 933 (1961). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
do not set forth the circumstances under which an accused may be arrested without 
warrant; that is left to statute and case law. But rule 5 expressly applies to a de-
fendant arrested with or without warrant. 
45. S. REP. No. 371, at IO; H. REP. No. 1,629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968) [herein-
after H. REP. No. 1,629]. 
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the law by specifying the purpose of the preliminary hearing: the 
legislative history of amended section 3060 makes clear that the 
only purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine probable 
cause, and that discovery is no longer, if it ever was, a purpose of 
the hearing.46 
B. Theoretical Screening and Discovery Functions 
of the Preliminary Hearing 
In contemporary judicial thinking, it is generally accepted that 
the task of screening out weak or unsupported charges and dis-
charging the defendant if the committing magistrate finds no 
probable cause to believe that he is guilty is a proper function of the 
preliminary hearing.47 The only doubts on this point have been 
whether the preliminary hearing is effective in carrying out this 
function,48 and what significance the decision at preliminary hearing 
should have in federal and other jurisdictions in which the prosecu-
tor is allowed to ignore the magistrate's ruling and to seek an orig-
inal indictment on the same charge.49 
46. S. REP. No. 371, at 34-35. 
47. See United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 53-54 (7th Cir. 1968); Sciortino v. 
Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); United States v. 
Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 467 (4th Cir. 1967); Boone v. United States, 280 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 
1960); L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM .ARREsr TO APPEAL 67-68 (1947); Note, 
The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IOWA L. REv. 164, 165, 167•68 
(1965); Note, Preliminary Examination-Evidence and Due Process, 15 KAN. L. REv. 
374, 375 (1967). 
Determination of probable cause was the purpose of the preliminary hearing most 
frequently cited by United States Commissioners responding l:o a questionnaire sent to 
them by the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery. See Hearings on 
S. 3,475, at 487. The Subcommittee sent a detailed questionnaire to each of the more 
than 730 commissioners and received in reply 407 substantially completed responses. 
Hearings on S. 3,475, at 453. The staff drew on this material to prepare a unique 
picture of the way in which commissioners view their role and functions. The report is 
printed as Appendix. I, Report by Subcomm. Staff on U.S. Commissioner Responses 
to Subcomm. Questionnaire, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 453-97 [hereinafter Questionnaire]. 
48. Serious criticism has been leveled at magistrates' ability and qualifications to 
conduct the preliminary hearing and other judicial duties. See L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE FROM .ARREsr TO APPEAL 75 (1947); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE• 
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 34-36 (1967), 
Two commissioners raised the issue with the Subcommittee on Improvements in 
Judicial Machinery in response to a question as to whether the preliminary hearing 
is well designed to achieve its goals: 
"Preliminary hearings, left to Commissioners, are very summary. The worth de-
pends on individuals. This is the reason more thought should be given to appoint-
ment." 
"If the office of Commissioner is competently discharged, I think it adequately 
serves its purpose. However, I personally know of U.S. Commissioners who were 
appointed because of their personal connections with a Federal Judg.,, and who 
have no other qualifications." 
Questionnaire 490-91. 
49. Questionnaire 491, stated that "[s]ome commissioners were critical of the 
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Rule 5(c), like its state counterparts, makes no express reference 
to affording the defendant discovery. But some degree of discovery 
is an inevitable result of an adversary hearing in which probable 
cause is established through the testimony of witnesses. The desire 
of prosecutors to avoid the discovery function of the preliminary 
hearing, rather than their desire to avoid the screening function, has 
given rise to the widespread practice of continuing the preliminary 
hearing date until the return of an indictment renders a hearing 
moot. 50 By the same token, it is defense counsels' desire to use 
the hearing as a means of obtaining discovery-a means not avail-
able under any other rule51-that has led them to challenge this 
practice and other restrictions on the opportunity to use preliminary 
hearings as a discovery device. 52 These challenges have yielded a 
body of recent case law on the subject of whether discovery is a 
legitimate function of a rule 5(c) preliminary hearing. 
Against the backdrop of these cases, and particularly the deci-
sions in the District of Columbia, the draftsmen of the Federal 
Magistrates Act fashioned section 303.53 In so doing they chose to 
fact that the government may seek an indictment from the grand jury regardless of 
whether the case had been heard by the commissioner, and regardless of his decision 
on probable cause if it was heard •••• " The staff report quotes from two commis• 
sioners who 
mentioned cases in which they had found no probable cause after which indict· 
ments had been obtained but without successful prosecution. 
"One year I dismissed six cases after which the Grand Jury indicted and, on 
trial in U.S. Court, all thereof were acquitted." 
" ••• I have discharged defendants, and the U.S. Attorney subsequently indicts 
them; in several cases, the Judge turned them loose again." 
Id. 
50. The possibility of saving time for prosecutors, law enforcement officials, and 
other witnesses by avoiding the preliminary hearing is an additional justification for 
the practice. 
In general, United States Attorneys have had free rein to avoid the preliminary 
hearing. Answers by two United States Commissioners to a Subcommittee question as 
to why preliminary hearings were not held were particularly disturbing: "When ap• 
pointed I was instructed by U.S. District Attorney to set hearings far enough in 
advance to allow for grand jury indictment." "It is the policy of the U.S. Attorney not 
to have preliminary hearings." Questionnaire 483 (emphasis added); cf. note 12 supra. 
51. None of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the cross• 
examination under oath of potential government witnesses before trial in order to 
obtain discovery of their testimony. Under rule 15(a), the court may, after indictment, 
allow the defendant to take the deposition of "a prospective witness [who] may be 
unable to attend or prevented from attending a trial or hearing" if his testimony is 
material and a deposition is necessary "to prevent a failure of justice." But this pro• 
vision was not intended as a discovery device and has not been used as such. See 8 
J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 15.02, at 15-4 (R. Cipes, 2d ed. 1968). Rule 16 covers 
only the discovery and inspection of written material and tangible objects. For a dis• 
cussion of the inadequacy of federal discovery procedures, see generally Comment, 
Preliminary Hearing in the District of Columbia-An Emerging Discovery Device, 56 
Gro. L.J. 191, 203-05 (1967). 
52. See note 40 supra. 
53. In a memorandum on the preliminary hearing prepared for use of the Sub-
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follow the weight of authority and reject the discovery function of 
the preliminary hearing. 54 Before criticizing this choice, it will be 
helpful to review the judicial precedent on the subject. Like the 
Committee, we will take special note of the case law that has devel-
oped in the District of Columbia, since it has differed markedly from 
practice in other parts of the federal judicial system. 
C. Case Law on the Functions of the 
Preliminary Hearing 
Although all of the participants in a preliminary hearing are well 
aware that discovery is a significant outcome of the proceedings, most 
courts have refused to recognize discovery as a valid purpose of the 
hearing. Instead, the courts have generally declared that screening 
cases for grand jury action is the sole valid purpose; the reported de-
cisions indicate that only rarely have courts thwarted the prosecutor's 
inclination to moot the hearing by seeking a continuance pending 
indictment. But the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit took a major step in curbing this practice in 196155 when an 
appellant alleged that postponement of his hearing pending indict-
ment was "representative of a general philosophy or pattern."56 
The court emphatically declared that "persons accused of crime are 
entitled to prompt preliminary hearings pursuant to Rule 5."57 
committee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, its staff paid particular attention 
to the law in the District of Columbia. See Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. J,475, 
at 265. See also Staff Memorandum, id. at 273, 274: "In the District of Columbia, 
the Court of Appeals for the first time is beginning to lay down standards for the 
proper conduct of a preliminary hearing • . • ." 
54. Hearings on S. J,475, at 2-3 (remarks of Senator Tydings): 
The subcommittee's previous hearings on the commissioner system have disclosed 
that a great deal of confusion exists about the procedures and purpose of the 
preliminary hearing. Indeed, any study of the common law background of the 
preliminary hearing, and of the cases which have been handed down since this 
Nation's formation will indicate that there is a great deal of cloudiness and con-
fusion about the range and purpose of preliminary hearings. The bill accepts the 
traditional notion that the hearing is solely a device for the determination of 
probable cause • • • • 
The preliminary hearing provision of the bill operates on the assumption that 
the problem of pretrial discovery should be treated separately and apart from the 
preliminary hearing. 
55. Drew v. Beard, 290 F.2d 741. 
56. 290 F.2d at 741. 
57. 290 F.2d at 742. The committing magistrate had postponed the hearing on the 
ground that the defendant was on bond, a ground disapproved by the court of appeals: 
"The fact that an accused is at liberty on bond does not in itself constitute a reason 
for denying him a prompt preliminary hearing, or postponing the hearing to a future 
date." 290 F.2d at 742. The language is dictum; the appeal was dismissed as moot 
because the preliminary hearing had been scheduled for the same day as the appeal 
was decided. However, the dictum had an important practical impact in reducing the 
practice of bypassing preliminary hearings in the District of Columbia. See also Wilson 
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Three years later, in Blue v. United States}8 the same court ana-
lyzed the purposes of the hearing and found discovery to be one of 
them: 
It has generally been thought that the purpose of a preliminary 
hearing is to afford the accused (1) an opportunity to establish that 
there is no probable cause for his continued detention and thereby 
to regain his liberty and, possibly, escape prosecution, and (2) a 
chance to learn in advance of trial the foundations of the charge 
and the evidence that will comprise the government's case against 
him.119 
Recognition of discovery as an independently valid purpose of 
the preliminary hearing proved to be a remarkably controversial 
statement-and one from which the court has recently retreated. 
After several decisions following Blue's recognition of the discovery 
function of the preliminary hearing,00 in Ross v. Sirica61 the court 
had to decide whether to review en bane a panel decision ordering 
the reopening of a preliminary hearing so that additional witnesses 
might be subpoenaed. The petition for en bane rehearing was 
denied over the vigorous dissent of three judges, who felt that the 
panel decision necessarily depended upon an erroneous belief that 
discovery was a valid purpose of the preliminary hearing.62 But 
the opinion which, because of the balance on the court, proved to 
be decisive was that of the two "swing" judges who voted to deny 
rehearing en bane on the ground that the witnesses should have 
v. Anderson, 335 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1964), in which the preliminary hearing was 
continued until the proceedings were dismissed as moot following indictment. Judge 
Bazelon (dissenting from an order of the court denying leave to appeal in forma 
pauperis from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus) stated that "the question how 
to vindicate this critical right [to confront witnesses in a preliminary hearing and to 
refute probable cause] is not frivolous and requires power over the processes of 
criminal justice." 335 F.2d at 691. 
58. 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965). 
59. 342 F.2d at 901 (footnote, citing no case authority, omitted). 
60. E.g., Dancy v. United States, 361 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Holmes v. United 
States, 370 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1966). But see Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965). For a comprehensive treatment of recent District of Columbia case law 
on the subject, see Comment, supra note 51, at 194-202. See also The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: 1961-65 Term, 54 GEO. L.J. 
185, 203-09 (1965). 
61. 380 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
62. Judge Danaher pointed out that "there is now and ••• for the last few years 
there has been substantial disagreement among the judges of this court on the matter 
of 'discovery' in preliminary hearings." 380 F.2d at 566. In a separate opinion, Judge 
Burger, with whom Judge Tamm joined, said that "[i]t should be clear ••• that a 
majority of the Court does not agree with the three judges of the sitting division in 
their effort to re-write the procedure authorized by Congress for a preliminary hearing 
so as to convert it into a discovery mechanism." 380 F.2d at 569. A fourth judge, with-
out intimating a position on the merits, would have granted rehearing to clarify 
uncertainties as to the proper function of the preliminary hearing. 380 F.2d at 569. 
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been subpoenaed for the purpose of resolving the issue of probable 
cause. In reaching their conclusion they restated the relationship 
of discovery to the preliminary hearing: 
The focus of the solicitude embodied in the procedural device of the 
preliminary hearing is the liberty of the accused. Should it be taken 
away from him because there is probable cause to believe that he has 
committed a crime for which the grand jury will indict? To the 
extent that the prosecution is put to its proof of such probable 
cause, the accused in effect gets discovery of that much of the 
Government's case as is comprised of the evidence it adduces to 
establish probable cause. But that is an inevitable consequence of 
the hearing, and not its primary purpose.63 
This limitation upon Blue's recognition of discovery as an indepen-
dently valid purpose of the hearing is particularly significant since 
it was ·written by the author of the Blue opinion.64 
Decisions in other circuits have not accepted discovery as a pur-
pose of the preliminary hearing. For them, the sole rationale of the 
preliminary hearing is to inquire whether there is probable cause to 
hold the defendant pending action by the grand jury. 65 On this 
premise, the' federal courts generally have not hesitated to rule that 
the defendant's right to the hearing is mooted when an indictment 
is returned prior to the date set for a preliminary hearing: since the 
only purpose of the hearing is to decide whether the defendant 
should be held for the grand jury, there is no longer any purpose to 
be served by a hearing after the grand jury has acted. 66 Some courts 
have also pointed out that the provisions of rule 5 do not apply to a 
defendant who is arrested under rule 9 following an original indict-
ment, 67 and that there is no rule under which such a defendant may 
be given a preliminary hearing.68 Therefore, the courts reason, once 
the grand jury has acted, a defendant who was arrested either by 
warrant under rule 4 or without warrant should be in the same 
68. 380 F.2d at 563 (statement of Judges McGowan and Leventhal on their reasons 
for voting to deny rehearing en bane). 
64. Judge McGowan, as the author of Blue, was at liberty to comment: "It may 
well be that there is language in the Blue opinion which obscures this true relation• 
ship of discovery to probable cause. But, however cloudy or misconceived that language 
may be, the relationship, as it is given to us to understand it, is as described above." 
380 F .2d at 563. 
65. See cases cited in note 47 supra. 
66. See cases cited in note 47 supra. See also United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 88 
(2d Cir. 1968). 
67. Swingle v. United States, 389 F.2d 220, 223 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 
U.S. 928 (1968); Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
68. A challenge to this disparity on equal protection grounds failed to obtain 
certiorari. Petition for Certiorari at 2, Swingle v. United States, 389 F.2d 220 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968). 
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position with respect to the hearing as a defendant who was arrested 
under rule 9. 
It is no coincidence that the few courts which hold that a pre-
liminary hearing is not automatically mooted by indictment are 
those which have recognized the value of the preliminary hearing 
in affording discovery to the defense. But for some reason the deci-
sions holding that indictment does not moot the hearing have not 
been premised on a need to afford discovery. In Blue, which shat-
tered precedent by holding that an indictment would not invariably 
moot the preliminary hearing,69 the District of Columbia Circuit 
considered the possible effect of a post-indictment finding of no prob-
able cause: 
In a preliminary hearing held or reopened after indictment, the 
Commissioner would continue under the necessity of making his 
own independent determination of probable cause. If he were per-
suaded that no such cause existed, that finding would result in his 
release of the defendant. It would not affect the indictment, although 
the Commissioner's action would presumably cause the prosecutor 
to review the indictment again with care. The defendant could be 
made to respond to the indictment by summons, or a resumption of 
custody could be sought by application for a bench warrant. In 
the latter case, such a singular circumstance as a finding of no 
probable cause by the Commissioner would presumably be a factor 
for consideration by the court.70 
This explanation, though technically impeccable, reveals the prac-
tical anomaly of requiring the commissioner to hold a probable 
cause hearing after the ultimate decision on probable cause has al-
ready been reached by a grand jury. A preliminary hearing after 
indictment realistically serves a useful function only in terms of 
discovery. Nevertheless, the "swing" judges in Ross v. Sirica, who 
69. The precedent-breaking language stated, inter alia: 
We do not believe ••• that the mere existence of an indictment renders academic 
any defects in the Commissioner's proceedings or necessarily insulates those defects 
from judicial correction. 
• • • Where a defendant is denied out of hand the opportunity to consider 
utilizing that value, we do not think that that denial is to be swept under the rug 
of a grand jury indictment. Neither do we think that the availability of a remedy 
should depend upon the outcome of a race between counsel seeking habeas corpus 
or mandamus and the grand jury acting upon the charge. We, therefore, conclude 
that relief in such a situation is not to be foreclosed solely by reason of an inter-
vening indictment. 
!142 F.2d at 899-900. In the case before it, however, the court declined to reverse the 
conviction on the grounds that the issue had not been timely raised and that the de-
fendant had not been prf judiced: "[W]e cannot find that the Commissioner's failure 
to accord appellant a meaningful opportunity to elect a preliminary hearing, and 
thereby to acquaint himself in greater detail with the case against him, so handicapped 
him in his first trial as to require a second." 342 F.2d at 901. 
70. 342 F .2d at 900 n.7. 
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sought to minimize the discovery function of the preliminary hear-
ing, indicated their unwillingness to retreat from the position that 
indictment does not automatically moot the hearing. They castigated 
the practice, found to exist in another jurisdiction, by which 
preliminary hearings are avoided through continuances granted 
routinely until mooted by an indictment. I£ such a practice were 
attempted in the District, we would find no insuperable barrier in 
meeting the problem through the sanction of requiring a hearing 
after indictment. Similarly, we see no jurisdictional barrier to a like 
sanction for coping with the withholding of critical witnesses whose 
testimony is the key to the issue of the reasonableness of continued 
detention.71 
The Supreme Court has been asked to resolve this conflict between 
the District of Columbia72 and the other circuits,73 but thus far it 
has declined.74 
III. CRITICISM OF THE NEW LEGISLATION 
Against this background of conflicting judicial opinion regarding 
the purposes of the preliminary hearing and its relationship to grand 
71. 380 F.2d at 563-64 (statement of Judges McGowan and Leventhal on their rea-
sons for voting to deny rehearing en bane) (footnote omitted). 
72. Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Dancy v. United States, 361 F.2d 
75 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 
380 U.S. 944 (1965). 
73. See cases cited in note 47 supra. For commentary on mootness and rule 5(c), 
see Note, The Preliminary Examination in the Federal System: A Proposal for a Rule 
Change, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1416, 1420-26 (1968). In United States ex rel. Wheeler v. 
Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), Judge Weinstein noted that "[m]ost 
courts have felt compelled to deny relief [when the government has delayed the hear-
ing pending indictment] on the ground that the issue of delay was mooted by 
indictment." In this case, in which the defendants had not yet been indicted, he 
ordered their release from custody unless a preliminary hearing was held later the 
same day. Moreover, he noted, "[a]t the insistence of the defendant, the preliminary 
hearing of a defendant brought before a Commissioner prior to indictment should 
take place before, or simultaneously with, presentment to the Grand Jury unless, of 
course, the Grand Jury is operating independently of the United States Attorney-a 
circumstance most rare.'' 269 F. Supp. at 198. 
74. Petition for Certiorari at 2, Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967), 
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968). In Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 220 (1965), 
the Supreme Court had said in dictum: 
[W]e think that the Government must proceed through the further steps of the 
complaint procedure by affording the defendant a preliminary hearing as required 
by Rule 5, unless before the preliminary hearing is held, the grand jury super-
sedes the complaint procedure by returning an indictment. 
In the Sirica case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit con-
cluded: 
]aben does not undermine the holding in Blue that an accused who demands the 
preliminary hearing as is his right is entitled to such a hearing and that, if the 
point is properly and timely pressed, a denial of that hearing cannot be excused 
by pointing to an intervening grand jury indictment. 
Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 560-61 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (footnote, noting that the issue had 
not been properly raised in the Jaben case, omitted). 
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jury action, the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery undertook a detailed study of the United States Commis-
sioner system. Chaired by Senator Tydings, this subcommittee held 
extensive hearings over a three-year period, first on the existing law 
and practices and later on preliminary drafts of the Federal Magis-
trates Act.75 The Act was the subject of more thorough, scholarly 
consideration than most legislation receives.76 
But the adequacy of the congressional appraisal of section 303 
in the broader context of federal pretrial criminal procedure is open 
to question. Our criticism of the congressional decision concerning 
the preliminary hearing, as embodied in section 303, 77 is twofold: 
first, it reflects inadequate appreciation of the hearing's potential 
ability to screen out weak cases, and second, it undermines use of 
the hearing for discovery while failing to provide any substitute. 
A. The Congressional Approach to the Screening 
Function of the Hearing 
Section 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act, which provides that 
a preliminary hearing "shall not be required" after indictment, rests 
upon a fallacious assumption that a grand jury's consideration of 
whether or not to return an indictment is equivalent to a prelimi-
nary hearing as a screening device. The Senate report on the bill 
contains the unexceptionable statement that "[n]o citizen should 
75. Hearings, pt. 1; Hearings on the United States Commissioner System Before 
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1965) [hereinafter Hearings, pt. 2); Hearings, 
pt. 3; Hearings on S. !J,475. 
By contrast, the two days of hearings in the House appear to have been conducted 
almost pro forma. See Hearings on S. 945, H.R.. 5,502, H.R.. 8,277, H.R. 8,520, 
H.R. 8,932, H.R.. 9,970, and H.R.. 10,841 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 17 (1968) [hereinafter House Hearings on 
S. 945]. The most extensive testimony was that of Senator Tydings, id. at 68-96, and 
William T. Finley, Jr., former Chief Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Im-
provements in Judicial Machinery, id. at 119-42. The House amended the legislation 
passed by the Senate but "most of the changes are designed either to clarify the act, 
to resolve possible inconsistencies between the act and other statutes, or to make 
grammatical improvements." H.R. REP. No. 1,629, at 10. A comparison of House and 
Senate (S. REP. No. 371) committee reports shows that the House Report is based in 
large part on that of the Senate. 
76. The legislative history, note 75 supra, shows an earnest attempt to fulfill Senator 
Tydings' opening promise: 
This is a hearing which we hope will mark the beginning of an extensive and 
exhaustive examination of the U.S. commissioner system. We intend to find out 
all there is to know about the current operation of the commissioner system, and 
to seek the best available advice from the bench, the bar and the commissioners 
themselves, of course, the persons who know most about this subject, in order to 
determine what reforms are needed in this long-neglected "front line" area of 
Federal justice. 
Hearings, pt. 1, at I. 
77. See note 6 supra. 
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have his liberty restrained, even to the limited extent of being re-
quired to post bail or meet other conditions of release, unless some 
independent judicial determination has been made that the restraint 
is justified.''78 But the report proceeds on the erroneous premise that 
"the magistrate, some judicial officer, [ and] the grand jury" are all 
capable, and equally so, of making an "independent judicial deter-
mination" that "restraint is justified.''79 
The grand jury is not a proper body to reach an "independent 
judicial determination" of probable cause. Its determination is 
unlikely to be "judicial" because it is composed of laymen, so whose 
sole guidance on legal questions will normally come from the prose-
cutor. Its determination is also unlikely to be "independent" in 
most cases because, in practice, the prosecutor's influence is usually 
controlling. In his classic 1932 study of preliminary criminal pro-
ceedings in Oregon, Wayne Morse observed that "studies of the 
grand jury show rather conclusively that it is not inclined to be an 
independent body but rather that it tends to stamp with approval, 
and often uncritically, the wishes of the prosecuting attorney.''81 
More recent studies support this conclusion;82 as the Second Circuit 
has stated, "[b ]asically the grand jury is a law enforcement agency.''83 
78. S. REP. No. 371, at 34 (emphasis added). 
79. Id. See also Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 14, quoted in note 99 
infra. 
80. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956): "[l]n this country as in 
England of old the grand jury has convened as a body of laymen, free from technical 
rules, acting in secret, pledged to indict no one because of prejudice and to free no 
one because of special favor." 
81. Morse &: Beattie, Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Oregon, 
11 ORE. L. R.Ev. 108-09 (Supp.) (1932); Morse, Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 
ORE. L. R.Ev. 101, 295 (1931); accord, Moley, Grand Jury, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF nIE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 148, 149 (1937) (volume 7 appears in volume 4 of the 1937 reissued ed.). 
82. E.g., Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189 (1967); 
cf. Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 
69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1171 (1960). 
Recently a grand jury at the end of its five-month term issued a report suggesting 
that the grand jury be abolished. The grand jury posed the following rhetorical 
questions: "Isn't the grand jury simply rubber-stamping what a trial judge has previ• 
ously decided? ••• Are not we but furthering the time element between arrest and 
trial? • • . True (the grand jury) is a fine means of practice for the State's Attorney's 
office and its witnesses. But is that enough to justify a grand jury?" Washington Post, 
Feb. 6, 1969, at E6. 
83. United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 
(1959). The court there said: 
Under the Assize of Clarendon in 1166 and for several centuries thereafter the sole 
function of the accusatory jury in the area of criminal law was to assist the Crown 
in law enforcement •••• And today, with its power to subpoena witnesses and 
question them in secret, the grand jury continues to be an important investigative 
instrument of the prosecutor. 
265 F.2d at 461 (citations omitted). See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 
283, 284 (E.D. Pa. 1933): "The inquisitorial power of the grand jury is the most valu-
able function which it possesses to-day and, far more than any supposed protection 
which it gives to the accused, justifies its survival as an institution." 
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In practice, the federal criminal justice system has relied primar-
ily on the discretion of prosecutors, and not on preliminary hear-
ings84 or independent grand jury decisions, to screen out weak cases. 
The prosecutor does not ordinarily want to take weak cases to trial 
and will ask leave of court85 to drop charges when, on reflection, 
evidence does not appear to warrant prosecution of a person already 
charged. But prosecutorial "reflection" may take an unreasonably 
long time. A committing magistrate, formerly an Assistant United 
States Attorney, noted that the value of the preliminary hearing 
lies less in the screening given by the hearing itself than in the 
effect which its pendency has on the prosecutor: 
It forces him ... to immediately screen his case. In other words, he 
doesn't let [the defendant] sit in jail for three months and then 
talk to the officer and dump it. It forces him to paper as we say .... 
[A] lot of [cases] are thrown out that wouldn't be thrown out if 
the prosecutor wasn't, out of his busy schedule, forced to look at 
the facts, forced to determine whether there's a case ••.. 86 
Moreover, the prosecutor has to take account of factors other 
than the possibility of winning a particular case. He must also make 
policy decisions such as whether he will take a hard line on certain 
types of crime, and it is unrealistic to expect that he can perform 
this task and still maintain a detached, objective view of the exact 
strength of each individual case. Indeed, that is not his function.87 
84. In the District of Columbia, most of the screening is undertaken by the prose• 
cutor prior to the time scheduled for the preliminary hearing. In consequence, very 
few cases actually result in discharge at the preliminary hearing. See statistics col· 
lected in PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 
233-35, figure 4, at 275 (1966). The Commission refers to the "pivotal role of the. 
prosecutor in no papering or dismissing substantial numbers of cases • • • ." Id. at 
235. In Chicago, on the other hand, the reverse is true. There the prosecutor dismisses 
very few cases but a substantial proportion are dismissed at the preliminary hearing. 
McIntyre, A Study of Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process, 59 J. CruM. L.C. & 
P.S. 463, 464 (1968). The author states that "[o]nly about 20 percent of the cases 
receiving a hearing are bound over to the Grand Jury for further prosecution." Id. 
at 463. 
85. FED. R. CruM. P. 48(a). See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA, REPORT 239 (1966) (footnote omitted): 
After initiating prosecution, the United States Attorney may still exercise his 
discretion to terminate the case. Unlike his decision not to prosecute, however, 
these decisions are supervised by the court, since the prosecutor must file a motion 
to dismiss or request leave to enter a nolle prosequi. As a practical matter, few 
of these requests are denied. 
In fiscal 1965, cases involving 15 percent of the felony defendants were termi• 
nated prior to trial • • • • Most of these dismissals occur on motion of the 
U.S. Attorney and are an exercise of his prosecutive discretion. 
86. Copy of interview on file at Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure, George-
town University Law Center, Washington, D.C. ·when references are made in the 
text to interviews commenting on the preliminary hearing in the District of Columbia, 
and to practices relating to the hearing, supporting data is on file at the Institute of 
Criminal Law, Georgetown University Law Center, under whose auspices the inter• 
views were conducted. 
87. The difference between a judicial and prosecutorial assessment of the appro-
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There are thus two drawbacks of depending on the prosecutor to 
screen out cases. First, unless he has to be prepared to make a 
prompt showing of probable cause he will naturally tend to post-
pone review. In addition, he does, and should, have a prosecutorial 
viewpoint. Both of these shortcomings are better remedied by pre-
liminary hearing than by grand jury screening. 
The fact that the preliminary hearing is both public and adver-
sary makes its screening more independent than the grand jury's.BB It 
is also more difficult to conceal evidentiary weaknesses at a prelimi-
nary hearing. Because the grand jury is composed of laymen, it 
is incompetent to make legal decisions about whether a prima facie 
case against the defendant exists. Indeed, since the Supreme Court 
held in Costello v. United StatesB0 that a valid indictment may be 
priateness of felony prosecution may be seen in connection with charges arising out 
of the April 1968 riots in Washington, D.C., following the death of Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. According to a newspaper account, a veteran district judge, review-
ing several hundred indictments in those cases, was of the opinion that the evidence 
in most of them was too weak for the cases to be tried as felonies. Washington Evening 
Star, Oct. 10, 1968, at Bl. The article reported that the judge said "that his review of 
more than 2:70 indictments charging 499 defendants may indicate about 25 'hard core' 
felonies. [The judge] said there is a number of cases the government cannot prove, 
and that many others could be reduced to misdemeanors •••• " Yet those cases had 
been screened by the prosecutor, the preliminary hearing, and the grand jury. For an 
account of preliminary hearings in the riot cases see Washington Post, April 28, 1968, 
at DI. The Post reported that at that time about 250 persons had been held for the 
grand jury after preliminary hearing, that only four defendants had waived the hearing, 
and that 25 defendants had had charges against them dismissed at preliminary hearing. 
In addition, the Post reported, "charges have been reduced or dropped in about 
another 250 cases." Id. Presumably action in these latter cases was an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion; see note 84 supra. 
88. As Dean A. Kenneth Pye of Duke Law School pointed out in testimony before 
the Subcommittee, the preliminary hearing is 
an adversary proceeding. This is why a defendant is given the right to cross-
examine, to call witnesses and to testify in his own behalf. He does not have 
these rights before a grand jury. Indeed, it is a crime for him to communicate 
with the grand jury without authority. Probable cause has already been deter-
mined ex parte by either an officer arresting without a warrant or by a commis-
sioner or judge in issuing a warrant. One reason for the commissioner's hearing 
is to test the assertion of probable cause by the best truth-seeking device which 
we have been able to develop-cross-examination by counsel. 
Hearings, pt. 3, at 270. Professor Samuel Dash of Georgetown University made a 
similar point: 
The bill treats the probable cause screening function of the grand jury on the 
same qualitative level as the probable cause determination by a judicial officer at 
a preliminary hearing. It leaves it to the prosecutor to decide which procedure 
will be made available to an arrested person. Yet can it be seriously argued that 
probable cause determined by laymen in secret under the guidance of the prose-
cutor and in the absence of the defendant and his counsel is anywhere near as 
protective of individual rights as the determination of probable cause by a judicial 
officer at a public preliminary hearing in the presence of the defendant and his 
counsel with the right of the defendant to cross-examine and present evidence in 
his own behalf? 
Hearings on S. 3,475, at 139. See also id. at 160 (testimony of Lawrence Speiser on be-
half of the American Civil Liberties Union). 
89. 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
May 1969] Preliminary Hearing 1383 
returned solely on the basis of hearsay testimony, there is no pre-
tense that federal grand juries screen out cases in which no compe-
tent evidence exists.90 An indictment based on illegally obtained 
evidence is slightly more vulnerable to a motion to dismiss,91 but 
whenever the court grants such a motion, screening by the grand 
jury has obviously failed. Moreover, the defendant may already 
have spent substantial time in jail prior to the ruling on the motion. 
At the present time, there is little authority to support legal 
objection to a federal committing magistrate's basing probable 
cause on hearsay or tainted evidence;92 the Federal Rules of Crim-
90. In the Second Circuit, the courts have severely criticized the practice of relying 
on hearsay evidence before the grand jury when better evidence is available, and have 
implied that the continuation of such a practice might result in quashing the indict-
ment. See United States v. Arcuri, 405 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1969). 
91. See Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States 
v. Tane, 329 F. 2d 848 (2d Cir. 1964); cf. Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128 
(D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 946 (1963). But cf. United States v. Blue, 384 
U.S. 251, 255 n.3 (1966). There surely are stronger reasons for quashing an indictment 
based on illegally obtained evidence than for quashing an indictment based on hear-
say. Note, Criminal Procedure-Grand Jury-Validity of Indictment Based Solely on 
Hearsay Questioned When Direct Testimony is Readily Available, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
578, 581 (1968): "Unlike the coerced confession or the illegal wiretap which will never 
have probative value at trial, hearsay, by its very nature, may be translated into 
competent evidence by the time of trial if the originator or primary source of the 
hearsay testifies in court." 
92. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has implied that, at least 
in certain types of cases, the committing magistrate should not be satisfied with the 
establishment of probable cause by hearsay evidence when first-hand testimony is 
available. See Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (footnote 
omitted): 
[W]e do not decide whether a Government case composed solely of hearsay can or 
cannot satisfy the requirement of "competent evidence" in a preliminary hearing. 
We decide only that under the circumstances shown here the decision and reasons 
of the Commissioner, on the [defendant's] request for the subpoena [the com-
plaining witness in a rape case], were clearly erroneous. 
Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (statements of Judges McGowan and 
Leventhal, on their reasons for voting to deny rehearing en bane) (footnote omitted): 
A judicial officer engaged in a judicial determination of probable cause can 
hardly rest easy solely with the hearsay account of the policeman of what these 
eye-witnesses told him if the eye-witnesses can be available, so that he can listen 
to their versions and observe their demeanor and provide an opportunity to 
defense counsel to explore their account on cross-examination. 
See also Wilson v. Anderson, 335 F.2d 687, 690 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1964) Gudge Bazelon, 
dissenting): 
Since Rule 5 guarantees the right of cross-examination at preliminary hearings, 
the question arises whether the rules concerning hearsay testimony are relevant. 
See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1362, 1367 (3d ed. 1940). If so, it may be improper for 
the material witnesses to "testify" at the hearing only through the hearsay testi-
mony of the arresting police officer • . . • 
The Staff of the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judiciary Machinery noted: 
"Apparently there has been virtually no case law discussion of the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence in preliminary hearings, and the question is open." Staff Memo• 
randum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 273, 274. The memorandum points out that in the 
District of Columbia, the "Court of Appeals for the first time is beginning to lay 
down standards for the proper conduct of a preliminary hearing . • . [the issue of 
the use of hearsay at the hearing] was expressly left open in Washington v. Clemmer 
••.• " Id. (citation omitted). 
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inal Procedure do not even deal with the question of what evidence 
can be admitted at preliminary hearings. The Manual For United 
States Commissioners states that "[p]robable cause is competent ev-
idence [sic] which induces a reasonable ground for the inference that 
the charges may be well founded."93 But committing magistrates 
simply do not follow this precept on any large scale.94 In the District 
of Columbia, for example, not only is hearsay evidence admitted at 
preliminary hearings, but probable cause is often founded on hear-
say alone.95 But the preliminary hearing's deficiency on this point is 
potentially remediable,96 whereas the grand jury's is not. 
In concluding that it is unnecessary for a committing magistrate 
to determine probable cause when the grand jury acts with relative 
promptness, the draftsmen of the Federal Magistrates Act did not 
seriously consider the potential usefulness of the preliminary hear-
ing as a screening device. This is clear from the manner in which 
the Senate Committee report attempts to rebut the "number of 
witnesses [who] suggested that preliminary examinations should be 
held in all cases, despite intervening indictments, and that the pre-
liminary examination should to some degree take the place of grand 
jury proceedings."97 Instead of addressing itself to the screening 
rationale underlying this argument, the report erroneously assumes 
that the sole reason for making the preliminary hearing mandatory 
would be to provide the defendant with discovery. The immediately 
succeeding language of the report is confined to a lengthy justifica-
tion for the Committee's conclusion that "the problem of discovery 
should be treated separately from that of the preliminary hearing."98 
The Committee's Report contains no discussion of the screening 
value of the preliminary hearing.99 
93. MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES CoMMISSIONERS 10 (1948) (emphasis added). 
94. See Address of Chief Justice Warren to Annual Meeting of the American Law 
Institute, May 20, 1964, in 35 F.R.D. 181, 189 (1964). 
95. See note 86 supra. 
96. See pt. IV. B. infra. 
97. S. REP. No. 371, at 34. 
98. Id. For a discussion of this position, see text accompanying notes 117-28 infra. 
99. It is also clear from his testimony before a House subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on the Judiciary that Senator Tydings assumed that those witnesses who had 
emphasized the importance of the preliminary hearing did so only for the discovery 
advantages it offered. House Hearings on S. 945, at 74. 
The Staff Memorandum prepared to accompany the draft legislation similarly 
assumes that the preliminary hearing serves no screening function which cannot be 
performed better by the grand jury: 
Viewed solely as a means of determining probable cause, the preliminary hearing 
is rendered obsolete by the modem practice-at least in urban areas-of a grand 
jury sitting continuously, returning indictments soon after an accused is taken into 
custody or even before he is arrested. It surely seems unnecessary and wasteful to 
have the question of probable cause determined twice, particularly when the firs& 
May 1969] Preliminary Hearing 1385 
The Subcommittee heard testimony criticizing the practice of 
United States Attorneys who moot the defendant's right to a pre-
liminary hearing by racing to the grand jury for an indictment.100 
But some concern was directed not so much to the grand jury in-
dictment mooting the hearing, as to the possibility of excessive 
delay in obtaining the indictment.101 The draftsmen were respon-
sive only to the latter criticism. Their purpose was not to insure 
that all defendants receive a preliminary hearing; instead, it was to 
insure that they not be held "too long" without either a prelimi-
nary hearing or a grand jury indictment.102 It was this accomplish-
ment of section 303 which President Johnson noted during the 
bill-signing ceremony. 
The influence of Senator Tydings may well have been decisive 
against ensuring the defendant the right to a preliminary hearing. 
His personal experience seemed to belie the widely accepted view 
that the grand jury is an inadequate means of protecting the de-
fendant. In response to a subcommittee witness who was "of the 
opinion that the grand jury proceedings provide no real safeguard 
for a person's constitutional and civil rights," Senator Tydings 
stated: "As one who was charged with a violation of the Corrupt 
Practices Act and not indicted, I cannot quite agree with you. 
The grand jury is, probably, a safeguard for the individual, too. 
I have been on both sides of the fence. That is for the record."103 It 
is unfortunate that Senator Tydings sought to generalize from such 
an atypical incident. When a similar colloquy arose later in the hear-
ings and the Senator again referred to his experience as proof "that 
the grand juries in this country protect the innocent as well as return 
determination at the preliminary hearing is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction 
upon the district court to proceed to the trial of the case. 
Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 14. Like the Senator, the memorandum 
proceeds to explain that discovery can best be provided elsewhere. Id. at 15. 
100. Hearings, pt. I, at 14, 37 (testimony of Prof. Charles A. Lindquist of Temple 
University and F. Archie Meatyard, Jr., U.S. Commissioner, Bethesda, Maryland); 
Hearings, pt. 3, at 220-22 (testimony of Prof. Irving Younger of New York University). 
101. See Hearings, pt. 3, at 242-43 (testimony of Judge Rozel C. Thomsen of the 
District of Maryland); Hearings on S. 3,475, at 99-100 (testimony of Prof. Lloyd L. 
Weinreb of Harvard University). 
102. A staff memorandum concluded that the "novel procedure," provided for in 
18 U.S.C.A. § 3060(b) (Supp. Feb. 1969). This section is quoted in note 6 supra, and 
seems to serve the primary purpose of a preliminary hearing; namely, to allow an 
arrested person a prompt determination by an appropriate authority of whether 
his detention is justified. This seems to be the only conceivable purpose of a pre-
liminary hearing that is not or cannot be served by other procedures in the law. 
Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 15. 
103. Hearings, pt. 1, at 14. The witness, Charles A. Lindquist, was drawing a com-
parison between grand jury and preliminary hearing, criticizing the ability of the 
prosecutor to obtain an indictment and thereby moot the hearing, and advocating that 
"the preliminary hearing [be] made to serve a more useful purpose." Id. 
1386 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:1861 
charges against the guilty," the witness, Lawrence Speiser of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, responded: "I might suggest that 
the grand jury considering the case of a former U.S. attorney or U.S. 
attorney might be slightly different than when it considers the 
majority of matters which come before it."104 It is possible that 
Senator Tydings' former practice as a United States Attorney was 
another factor underlying the congressional assumption that the 
preliminary hearing is unnecessary when the grand jury has acted. 
In the hearings he made it clear that during his tenure as a prosecu-
tor the preliminary hearing was regularly mooted by indictment, 
even if the defendant had indicated that he wished to have a hear-
ing.105 
It is ironic that statutory contraction of the committing magis-
trates' preliminary hearing function comes at a time when the 
magistrates themselves will be better qualified to perform it, and 
when substantial new judicial duties are being entrusted to them.100 
104. Hearings on S. 3,475, at 160. 
105. Hearings, pt. 1, at 37: 
Senator TYDINGS. Do you feel that in any revision or study that is related to the 
commissioners that there should definitely be a provision made for preliminary 
hearings giving a defendant the absolute right of a preliminary hearing? 
Mr. MEATYARD. Giving the defendant the right of a preliminary hearing? 
Yes, I do. 
Senator TYDINGS. For instance, do you feel that Tom Kenney's policy as 
U.S. attorney, which is directly opposite to his predecessor's policy-namely-mine, 
would be a better policy, that is to say, where a defendant has indicated that he 
wishes to have a preliminary hearing, he should be permitted to have a pre• 
liminary hearing prior to any U.S. attorney being able to take the case to the 
grand jury? 
Mr. MEATYARD. I think so, yes. That points up the need that you are going 
to have to select capable personnel to conduct preliminary hearings. 
The witness, F. Archie Meatyard, Jr., had served as United States commissioner at 
Bethesda, Maryland, for approximately nineteen years. Id. at 15. 
106. The laudable purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act was "to abolish the 
office of U.S. commissioner and reform the first echelon of the Federal judiciary into 
an effective component of a modern scheme of justice by establishing a system of U.S. 
magistrates." S. REP. No. 371, at 8; H.R. REP. No. 1,629, at 11. The new magistrates are 
required to be attorneys "unless it is impossible to find a qualified attorney to fill a 
particular position" and the "anachronistic fee system of compensation" is replaced 
by "a system of salaries set on a sliding scale according to anticipated workload." Id. 
The question of whether magistrates have been adequately upgraded, or whether 
their judicial functions would more properly be exercised by an article Ill judge, is 
beyond the scope of this Article. The dissenting views on this point by Mr. Cahill to 
the Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, which approved the bill, raise 
some serious questions. Representative William T. Cahill argues: 
Our Constitution does not refer to, nor provide authority for, a Federal magis• 
trate system. To the contrary, article Ill specifically provides that Federal judicial 
power must be vested in "the Supreme Court and such other inferior courts, as 
the Congress may from time to time establish." Moreover, article II requires that 
judges of the Supreme Court and "All other officers of the United States whose 
appointments shall be established by law" must be appointed by the President 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Federal judges are also provided 
lifetime tenure, and protection against diminution of their salaries. 
Contrary to these constitutional provisions, magistrates would be appointed by 
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In the past, the magistrates' lack of judicial qualifications un-
doubtedly contributed to the assumption that the preliminary hear-
ing and the grand jury proceeding serve much the same purpose; if 
both procedures may be conducted by laymen and dominated by the 
prosecutor, there appears little reason to choose between them. 
Almost one third of the more than 700 current United States Com-
missioners are not lawyers,107 and previously only minimal efforts 
had been made to provide them with "on the job training"-even 
if such instruction were feasible in such a complex and rapidly 
changing field. Formal legal assistance was largely limited to that 
provided in the Manual for United States Commissioners, a wholly 
inadequate pamphlet distributed by the Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts and not revised since 1948.108 The open-
ing paragraph of the Manual, after assuring commissioners that they 
should feel free to confer with the district court judge when neces-
sary, goes on to say: 
In any case where the commissioner desires the assistance and advice 
of the United States attorney or his assistants at any stage of a pro-
Federal district court judges for a tenure of only 8 years. Yet these officers of court 
would be empowered to adjudicate an unlimited and undefined range of Federal 
••• civil, and criminal matters. 
H.R. REP. No. 1,629, at 44. In addition to the constitutional questions, Representative 
Cahill points to the disadvantages of allowing district court judges to appoint officials 
whose salaries range up to $22,500. Id. at 46. This point had also been raised during 
the hearings. See Hearings, pt. 3, at 282 (testimony of Dean A. Kenneth Pye of Duke 
Law School); Hearings on S. 3,475, at 132-33 (statement of Prof. Samuel Dash of 
Georgetown University). 
Section 302 of the Act expands the magistrates' trial jurisdiction to misdemeanors 
punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than 
$1,000 or both, subject to the defendant's election to be tried by a magistrate and his 
right to appeal to the district court. S. REP. No. 371, at 8-9; H.R. REP. No. 1,629, at 
11-12. The district courts are empowered to promulgate rules assigning the magistrates 
"such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States." Section 101 of the Act, amending 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1964). The 
subsection continues: 
The additional duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to-
(1) service as a special master in an appropriate civil action, pursuant to the 
applicable provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 
the United States district courts; 
(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or discovery pro-
ceedings in civil or criminal actions; and 
(3) preliminary review of applications for posttrial relief made by individuals 
convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report and recommendations 
to facilitate the decision of the district judge having jurisdiction over the case as 
to whether there should be a hearing. 
28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b) (Supp. Feb. 1969). 
107. S. REP. No. 371, at 10; H. REP. No. 1,629, at 13. 
108. See Testimony of Warren Olney, III, Director, Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, Hearings, pt. 2, at 156-57. See also Hearings, pt. I, at 25 (testi-
mony of Fritz 1,V. Windhorst, U.S. Commissioner, New Orleans, La.) Seventy-seven per 
cent of the commissioners who responded to the Subcommittee's questionnaire indi-
cated that they thought the Manual was in need of revision. Questionnaire 471. 
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ceeding, or in conducting a preliminary examination, he should 
make a request of the United States attorney therefor .... At times 
the advice of the United States law enforcement agencies may also 
be helpful.109 
Excessive reliance on prosecutors and law enforcement agencies was 
apparent from the responses of some commissioners to a question-
naire sent to them by the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements 
in Judicial Machinery;110 in fact, some nonlawyer commissioners 
cited the ability to turn to the prosecutor for advice as a reason 
why legal training was unnecessary for committing magistrates.111 
A further reason why legal training for magistrates may have 
seemed unnecessary under the previous commissioner system was the 
fact that the defendant usually had no lawyer to raise legal questions. 
Many federal defendants are indigent,112 but neither Congress113 nor 
the Supreme Court provided for appointment of counsel prior to the 
defendant's arraignment upon the indictment114 until 1964, when 
109. MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS 1 (1948) (emphasis added). The final 
admonition that "the commissioner should always bear in mind that his judicial 
decisions should be his own, based on the law and the facts in the light of his own 
best judgment," can hardly undo the damage to that independent judicial spirit which 
the Manual formally endorses, but has in fact undercut. 
110. See note 50 supra; note 111 infra. When the commissioners were asked by the 
Subcommittee how they were informed of recent decisions affecting their duties, some 
of their responses 
again seemed to indicate reliance on the presecutors [sic] and law enforcement 
agents: 
"Not informed, but U.S. Attorney very helpful in giving any advice asked-I 
really depend on U.S. Atty. &: F.BJ. to avoid technical mistakes." 
"Actually the U.S. Attorney helps as much as anyone." 
"Informed by federal judge, F .BJ. agents-U .S. Clerks of Court and U.S. 
Deputy Marshals-and by mail." 
"Only by the grapevine or hearsay." 
"Usually receive directions from U.S. Attorney, or clerk or [sic] anything 
important." 
Questionnaire 471. 
111. Questionnaire 463. 
112. See ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITIEE ON POVERTY AND THE .ADMINISTRATION OF 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT 20 (1963): "[I]t is the Committee's best judgment 
that in the country as a whole something over one-third of federal defendants are 
financially unable to supply themselves with competent counsel and that in many fed-
eral districts one-half or more of such defendants find themselves in this position.'' 
113. See note 115 infra and accompanying text. In 1960, however, Congress had 
provided for representation of indigents in the District of Columbia. District of Colum-
bia Legal Aid Act, D.C. CODE §§ 2-2201-10 (1967). The Act specifically provided for 
representation by Legal Aid attorneys "in preliminary hearings in felony cases.'' D.C. 
CODE § 2-2202 (1967). It was probably not purely coincidence that the landmark 
decision of Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 
944 (1965), followed by three years the establishment of the Legal Aid Agency in 1961. 
Blue relied on "what we conceive to be the letter, as it is certainly the spirit, of the 
1960 statute" in requiring the United States commissioner to inform the defendant of 
his right to the assignment of counsel. 342 F .2d at 898. 
114. See note 115 infra. The Attorney General's committee found that "[i]n most 
federal districts appointed counsel first enters the case when the accused is brought 
before the court on arraignment and is required to plead to the indictment." AT-
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the Criminal Justice Act provided for appointment of counsel 
at the preliminary-hearing stage.115 Providing counsel tends to in-
crease the frequency of preliminary hearings, since unrepresented 
defendants often waived preliminary hearings or failed to object 
when the prosecutor requested a postponement in order to moot the 
hearing by indictment. The staff of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery reported: 
A number of commissioners expressed concern as to whether defen-
dants without counsel understand the nature and purpose of the 
preliminary hearing. They indicated that his [sic] failure to under-
stand results in frequent waiver by uncounselled defendants: 
"It is difficult to explain the significance of the preliminary hearing 
to many." 
"Even after thorough explanation some defendants don't seem to 
understand what a preliminary examination is."116 
TORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE .ADMINIS1'RATION OF FEDERAL CRIM-
INAL JumCE, REPORT 27 (1963). 
115. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964). The House Report 
stated: 
[G]uaranteeing counsel at every stage of the proceedings, commencing with the 
initial appearance before the commissioner, is designed to afford representation to 
each defendant throughout his involvement in the judicial process. It insures that 
the advice of counsel will be available at the critical early stages when recollections 
are fresh and the opportunity to uncover evidence is greatest. 
H.R. REP. No. 864, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963). In 1966, the Supreme Court reflected 
the change by amending rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to guar-
antee the defendant's right to the assignment of counsel "at every stage of the proceed-
ings from his initial appearance before the commissioner." FED. R. CRIM. P. 44 
Prior to its amendment in 1966, the rule had provided: "If the defendant appears in 
court without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign 
counsel to represent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed 
without counsel or is able to obtain counsel." The Court also amended rule 5(b) to 
require that the magistrate inform defendants of this right. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(b), 
Advisory Committee Note to 1966 amendment: "The second change obligates the 
commissioner to inform the defendant of his right to request the assignment of 
counsel if he is unable to retain counsel." Prior to the 1966 amendment to Rule 5(b), 
the commissioner was required to inform the defendant only "of his right to retain 
counsel." 
116. Questionnaire 479. Surprisingly, fifty-five per cent of the commissioners 
who responded to the questionnaire thought that the frequency of waiver was not 
significantly affected by whether the accused was represented by counsel. Id. The need 
for counsel at preliminary hearing is forcefully asserted in 1 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE 
OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 76 (1965): 
Apart from the possibility of a constitutional requirement, it seems clear that 
counsel should be present at the preliminary hearing, since the defendant without 
counsel at that stage is at a tactical disadvantage, as pointed out in several of the 
state reports. First, he does not know whether to ask for the hearing or to waive 
it. If the hearing is held, he does not know how to cross-examine the state's wit-
nesses, or whether to testify himself. He does not know whether to ask that a record 
be made of the hearing. He does not know the requisite legal elements of the 
offense with which he is charged, nor of lesser related offenses, so he is unable 
to discuss intelligently with the prosecutor possible reduction or dismissal of the 
charges. Moreover, it is possible, especially if the committing magistrate is un-
trained in the law, that the defendant will be bound over for the grand jury on 
insufficient evidence or that political considerations will affect his decision. 
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The Criminal Justice Act of 1964 and the Federal Magistrates 
Act of 1968, taken together, offer for the first time in the federal 
jurisdiction the promise that preliminary hearings will generally 
have both counsel and a tribunal qualified to perform the hearings' 
important screening function. Unless this potential is frustrated by 
section 303 of the Magistrates Act, the preliminary hearing should 
at last be able to fulfill its potential as a screening mechanism 
through which felony cases should pass before going on to the grand 
jury and to trial. 
B. Congressional Approach to the Discovery 
Function of the Hearing 
By providing that a preliminary hearing is unnecessary if an 
indictment is returned within the time limits specified in section 303, 
the draftsmen of the Magistrates Act made clear their view that 
discovery was no longer, if it ever had been, an independently valid 
purpose of the hearing.117 The subcommittee was not, apparently, 
unimpressed with the testimony it heard stressing the need for dis-
covery in criminal cases.118 But it was not convinced that discovery 
should take place at the preliminary hearing. 
In general, the hearing affords the defendant an opportunity to 
learn the basis of the charges against him, by testimony given under 
oath and subject to cross-examination, shortly after the commission 
of the crime with which he is charged.119 The draftsmen were not 
unaware of these advantages, but in justifying section 303 they 
emphasized the lack of uniformity in defendants' ability to obtain 
a preliminary hearing. The Senate committee report correctly noted 
that 
the degree of discovery obtained in a preliminary hearing will vary 
depending on how much evidence the presiding judicial officer 
thinks is necessary to establish probable cause in a particular case. 
This may be quite a bit, or it may be very little, but in either event 
117. See note 99 supra. 
118. S. REP. No. !!71, at !14. 
119. See note 40 supra. See also Symposium-Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 
33 F.R.D. 47, 70 (1964) (remarks of Professor Frank J. Remington): 
[D]iscovery in a State like Wisconsin, which has little formal discovery, may in fact 
be much more complicated than it may appear. Although the preliminary ex-
amination was in its inception and certainly in its theory designed to afford a pro• 
tection against being subjected to a trial when there does not exist probable cause 
to hold a person for trial, there is no question whatsoever that in practice it is used 
largely, if not entirely, as a discovery device. As a consequence, at least where 
the defendant is adequately represented, he is able to learn a great deal about the 
prosecution's case by demanding a preliminary examination. 
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it need not be all the evidence ·within the possession of the Govern-
ment that should be subject to discovery.120 
Moreover, as Senator Tydings pointed out, defendants first arrested 
after indictment rather than pursuant to rule 4 are ineligible for a 
preliminary hearing and so cannot use it as a discovery device.121 
This is a negative equal protection rationale which would deny 
discovery opportunities to some defendants because the law fails to 
grant them to others. 
A second principal reason for the committee's conclusion that the 
preliminary hearing does not afford "an ideal opportunity for dis-
covery"122 was its belief that the hearing "should be held within a 
short time after the accused is first arrested. Discovery, on the other 
hand, can most usefully take place at a later stage, much closer to 
trial, when the evidence is more nearly complete and defense coun-
sel is better prepared."123 No doubt discovery closer to trial, after 
attorneys for both sides have had an opportunity to become familiar 
with the case, would serve a useful purpose. But the defendant also 
has a vital interest in obtaining discovery promptly. Because human 
memory is fallible, evidence which is obtained immediately after 
the event is more likely to be reliable than evidence which is given 
later;124 defense lawyers are well aware of the tactical advantage in-
120. S. REP. No. 371, at 34. See United States v. Bates, 287 F. Supp. 657, 661 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1968): 
Having concluded that the purpose in seeking to call the witness was to obtain 
discovery and not to shed light upon the issue of probable cause, the Commissioner 
was acting within his inherent authority to confine the preliminary hearing to 
the matters in issue in declining to require that ATU [Alcohol Tax Unit] Agent 
Sampley submit to examination by the defendant. 
None of the witnesses who testified before the Subcommittee and no one interviewed 
in the District of Columbia project (see note 86 supra) favored adoption of the English 
practice at preliminary hearing. Prior to Parliament's enactment of the Criminal Justice 
Act of 1967, the English preliminary hearing was a full-scale discovery proceeding at 
which all witnesses whom the government planned to use at trial had to be called. 
Williams, Introductory Survey of the Preliminary Examination in England, in Hearings 
on S. J,475, at 307. The disadvantage lay in the "enormous waste of time by magis-
trates in having to take down the depositions of prosecution witnesses (by the hand 
of their clerk)." The Criminal Justice Act of 1967 sought to overcome this problem 
by providing that the defendant might waive the hearing, and in return for waiver, 
obtain written depositions of all the witnesses. Id. 
121. Hearings on S. J,475, at 29: "[U]nder current doctrines it will always be pos-
sible to bypass the preliminary hearing-and therefore discovery-by proceeding 
rapidly to indictment after arrest, or by arresting the defendant ohly after an indict-
ment has been returned.'' 
122. S. REP. No. 371, at 34. 
123. Id. at 34-35; cf. Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. J,475, at 29, 35. 
124. See G. WILUAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 104-05 (3d ed. 1963) (footnotes omitted): 
[I]t really needs no psychologist to show that, although instances occur of delayed 
reproduction, memory generally fades with the passage of time, and that, when a 
witness is required more than once to recall an event, his act of recall on a subse-
quent occasion may be merely an imperfect memory of what he said on an 
earlier. If this is true, it is an interesting commentary on the legal rule whereby 
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herent in preserving witnesses' testimony before it becomes "pol-
ished" or influenced by subsequent experiences.125 Nor does the 
value of preserving early recollection always lie with the defendant. 
Testimony favorable to the prosecution may also be "frozen" at the 
preliminary hearing while witnesses or victims are feeling particu-
larly hostile to the defendant-before affection, remorse, sympathy, 
or fear may have diluted the quality of their testimony. Moreover, 
by encouraging the prosecutor to test his case only in the secrecy 
and security of the grand jury setting, the new legislation reduces 
the government's chance of learning how well its witnesses will per-
form in public and under cross-examination. 
The draftsmen's position would have been more tenable if their 
criticism of the adequacy of the preliminary hearing as a discovery 
device had been accompanied by a substitute proposal for discovery. 
In an early formulation of the bill, they provided such a substitute 
by a legislative directive to adopt discovery measures through the 
rulemaking process. A published staff memorandum, commenting 
on a preliminary unpublished draft of the Act, states that 
the bill contains a guiding statement enjoining the rulemakers to 
take into account not only the benefits to the judicial process of 
liberal pretrial discovery, but also national security interests and 
the wellbeing of witnesses in cases where an unfettered discovery pro-
cedure might jeopardize either. The rules can therefore provide for 
appropriate exception to the general right of discovery when the 
Government can show good cause for making such an exception.126 
Unfortunately, the discovery provision had been dropped by the 
time that the first printed draft of the legislation appeared.127 In its 
stead, the Committee appended a concluding exhortation to its 
the witness's statement, given in court perhaps months after the event, is the real 
evidence, while his original proof of evidence, given perhaps within hours of the 
event, and his deposition at the preliminary hearing, given a few days or weeks 
after the event, are referred to only for the purpose of contradicting him and not 
as independent evidence. 
Chapter 5, Mistaken Evidence, which includes this quotation, is a sobering appraisal 
of the extent to which reliance should be placed on eyewitness testimony. 
125. See note 86 supra. A typical observation of a defense lawyer is, "I think it's 
important to get [testimony] on the record before it's gotten too polished, as it does 
by the time it's gone through grand jury and to the stage of trial." Or, "you have a 
situation [at preliminary hearing] where these people are committed to a position 
before they haYe had a chance to talk to many friends or neighbors or other witnesses, 
before they have been influenced, and perhaps improperly." 
126. Staff Memorandum, April 28, 1966, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 16. 
127. The first printed draft of S. 3,475 is reproduced in Hearings on S. 3,475, at 
17-25. A second staff memorandum, prepared to accompany S. 3,475 and dated June 7, 
1966, is almost identical with its predecessor cited in note 126 supra. See Staff Memo• 
randum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 29. Significantly, however, the language quoted in the 
text accompanying note 126 is omitted. 
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discussion of why discovery was not a valid purpose of the prelimi-
nary hearing: "[T]he committee does urge the Judicial Conference 
and the Supreme Court to give careful consideration to further 
liberalization of the existing discovery procedures provided in crim-
inal rule 16."128 
C. Problems of Construction 
As a matter of draftsmanship, it is unfortunate that section 303 
is written as an amendment to section 3060 of title 18 rather than 
as an amendment to rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. While former section 3060 consisted solely of a cross-
reference to the provisions of rule 5(a)-(c),129 section 3060, as 
amended by section 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act, eliminates 
any cross-reference to rule 5. Presumably this omission was not in-
tended to repeal subsections (a) and (b) of rule 5; despite the deletion 
of the Code section's cross-reference to them, nothing in the legisla-
tive history supports their implied repeal. But subsection (c) of rule 
5 presents a more difficult question of implied repeal. For the new 
section 3060, entitled "Preliminary examination," is sufficiently 
comprehensive so that it arguably replaces the shorter rule 5(c). 
The new section 3060(£) speaks in terms of "[p]roceedings before 
United States magistrates under this section,"130 not "under Rule 
5(c).'' The preceding subsection, 3060(c), provides that "[n]o pre-
liminary examination in compliance with subsection (a) of this sec-
tion shall be required .... " when a timely indictment intervenes. 
This presumably does not contemplate the possibility that a pre-
liminary examination in compliance with rule 5(c) could still 
be required. Thus, the provision in rule 5 (c) authorizing a prelimi-
nary examination is apparently superseded by subsection (a) of sec-
tion 3060, and section 3060(a) is meant to be the sole source of the 
right to a preliminary examination. But if rule 5(c) is repealed to 
the extent that it no longer provides the basis for holding a prelim-
inary hearing, do the incidents of the hearing prescribed by rule 5(c) 
-including the defendant's right to cross-examine and to introduce 
evidence-survive the implicit repeal of the basic provision au-
thorizing a hearing? Or are these and other incidents of the hearing 
to be prescribed by courts and magistrates as part of a process of 
128. S. REP. No. 371, at 35. 
129. A number of sections of title 18 follow this same form. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3001-
741 (1964). 
130. The new section provides: "Proceedings before the United States magistrates 
under this section shall be taken down by a court reporter •••. " 18 U.S.CA. § 3060 
(Supp. Feb. 1969) (empasis is added). This section is reprinted in note 6 supra. 
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formulating rules of procedure and evidence needed to carry out the 
mandate of section 3060(a): "preliminary examination shall be held 
... to determine whether there is probable cause .... "? The lat-
ter construction seems more consistent with the rest of new section 
3060; it would also leave greater scope for judicial implementation 
of improvements in preliminary hearing procedures. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
Some of the potential drawbacks of the Federal Magistrates Act 
can be mitigated or overcome through judicial action in formulating 
case law or rules of procedure. We shall here consider what steps, 
short of legislative amendment, may be taken to rectify apparent 
deficiencies in the Act and to take advantage of the opportunities it 
affords. 
A. Prompt Hearing 
We have thus far assumed that the prosecutor will be allowed to 
avoid the preliminary hearing if he is able to obtain an indictment 
within the time limits specified in the Act. This is a plausible assump-
tion in view of the previous widespread practice in which United 
States Commissioners, without any express legislative authorization, 
willingly granted continuances of preliminary hearings so that prose-
cutors would have enough time to moot the hearing.131 But better-
qualified magistrates will be appointed under the Act, and such 
solicitude for prosecutorial convenience may be at an end. Other 
jurisdictions are free to accept the example of the District of Colum-
bia Circuit132 and refuse to tolerate this practice, for the Act does 
not in terms give the United States Attorney a free hand to moot the 
hearing so long as he does so promptly.133 Section 3060(b) provides 
for a hearing "within a reasonable time," "but in any event not later 
than" ten or twenty days after the defendant's initial appearance. 
"These are outer limits only," the Senate committee report states, 
"and a court or magistrate may well decide that a reasonable time 
131. See S. REP. No. 371, at 33; Hearings, pt. 1, at 14, 37 (testimony of Prof. 
Charles A. Lindquist of Temple University and F. Archie Meatyard, Jr., U.S. Commis-
sioner, Bethesda, Maryland); Hearings, pt. 3, at 220-22 (testimony of Prof. Irving 
Younger of New York University), 254-55 (statement of Judge Talbot Smith of the 
Eastern District of Michigan). 
132. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra. 
133. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3060(b) (Supp. Feb. 1969) (quoted in note 6 supra). The 
contrary implication in an early staff memorandum is not borne out by the legisla-
tion, as other legislative history indicates. See note 134 infra and accompanying text. 
Staff Memorandum, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 9, 15: "The bill .•• provides for a pre-
liminary hearing only in those cases in which the grand jury has not acted within a 
reasonable time after arrest and presentment." 
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is well within these limits under the circumstances of a particular 
case."134 Such a "particular case" should be interpreted by the 
courts to include any case in which the defendant demands an im-
mediate hearing, unless the government can show the same "extra-
ordinary circumstances" which would authorize a delay beyond the 
ten- or twenty-day limit under section 3060(c). This interpretation 
would not be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act;135 the evil 
that section 303 purportedly sought to overcome was the practice of 
detaining a defendant indefinitely with no probable cause deter-
mination by either magistrate or grand jury.136 
Unless the "reasonable time" requirement in section 3060(b) is 
construed to mean less time than it takes to procure an indictment, 
the United States Attorneys' offices will be able to revert to the prac-
tice of racing to the grand jury in order to moot the defendant's 
right to a hearing. As noted above, judges on the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit have said that they would see 
no objection to requiring a hearing after indictment;137 but this was 
prior to passage of the Magistrates Act, and the Act specifically states 
that "[n]o preliminary examination ... shall be required ... if ... 
an indictment is returned."138 This language will undoubtedly make 
it more difficult for courts to control prosecutors' attempts to cir-
cumvent the preliminary hearing, but one option is still available to 
the federal judiciary: under the Act, the courts retain the power to 
require that a preliminary hearing be held on demand, without wait-
ing for the time limits given in the Act to expire. Affording the 
134. S. REP. No. 371, at 34. See also Hearings on S. 3,475, at 241 (remarks of Senator 
Tydings) (emphasis added): "Let me emphasize that these are only outer limits, and 
that the bill reaffirms the requirement that the preliminary hearing be held within 
a reasonable time. In most cases a reasonable time may be well within the outer limits." 
135. Cf. the exchange between Senator Tydings and Professor Lloyd L. Weinreb 
of Harvard University, Hearings on S. 3,475, at 99-100. In his prepared statement, 
Professor Weinreb had said: 
Even as prescribing the outside limits of a "reasonable time," the periods specified 
are too long. There are no circumstances in which a person should be detained 
unwillingly for as much as ten days before it is competently determined even 
whether he should be held for trial. • . . In no circumstances, should the pre-
liminary examination be delayed because the Government is building its case; 
if the Government lacks probable cause to detain, it should not arrest. Contrary to 
a suggestion implicit in the Subcommittee's staff memorandum, in no circumstance 
should timing of the examination be fixed so that an indictment can intervene and 
avoid the hearing. 
Id. at 105. 
1!16. The legislative history contains no criticism of jurisdictions in which prelimi-
nary hearings are routinely held, but only of those jurisdictions where hearings are 
routinely postponed pending return of an indictment. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 371, at 3!1; 
Hearings on S. 3,475, at 28 (remarks of Senator Tydings). 
137. Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1967) Gudges McGowan and 
Leventhal, voting to deny rehearing en bane); see text accompanying note 71 supra. 
1!18. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3060(e) (Supp. Feb. 1969) (quoted in note 6 supra). 
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defendant a prompt preliminary hearing would assure continuation 
of the screening and discovery advantages now available at prelim-
inary hearing. Moreover, holding the hearing promptly after arrest 
would reduce the incidence of "arrests for investigation."130 
B. Rules of Evidence 
After learning of the disparity in commissioners' practices con-
cerning the admissibility of hearsay, Senator Tydings stated that 
"there should be some statutory guidelines as to evidence which is 
admissible in hearings for probable cause."140 But no such guidelines 
were included in the Act, and it seems likely that the point, which 
was raised early in the hearings in 1965, had been forgotten when 
the legislation was finally drafted. 
At present, federal preliminary hearings are not generally held 
pursuant to the usual rules of evidence.141 Some years ago Chief 
Justice Warren noted this fact and commented that a proposal before 
the Judicial Conference to make the usual rules applicable to pre-
liminary hearings provided the defendant waived indictment "would 
be in accord with the more enlightened procedures developed in 
some of the states of the Union."142 
139. As Dean A. Kenneth Pye stated in testimony before the Subcommittee: 
The requirement that the defendant be brought before the commissioner without 
unnecessary delay and the right of the defendant to have a hearing to determine 
whether there is probable cause combine to discourage law enforcement officers 
from arresting on suspicion and then investigating the case at their leisure to 
determine whether there is probable cause. 
Hearings, pt. 3, at 270. This advantage of the preliminary hearing was recognized over 
a hundred years ago in New York, where concern was expressed over the "arrest of a 
person upon testimony which would be insufficient to hold him, and his detention 
until evidence can be hunted up, upon which the magistrate might be warranted in 
committing him." NEW YORK STATE, FOURTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE 
AND PLEADINGS, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE XXV (1849). The solution proposed was 
that the preliminary hearing be held as soon as possible, preferably at one sitting. 
If adjournments were necessary, the hearing was to be continued for only two days 
at a time, and not more than six days in all, "unless by consent or on motion of the 
defendant." Id. at xxvi. Cf. J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CO-
LONIAL NEW YORK 343 (1944): 
Sometimes, too, the grand jury, unable to find a bill, would nevertheless have the 
defendant kept in custody in the hope of developing at a later time sufficient evi-
dence on which to charge the accused. Thus Robert Wilson appeared in the Su-
preme Court on March 19, 1727 /28, and "the Grand Jury not having sufficient 
witness brought before them to find a bill of indictmt but in as much as 
they can see strong cause of suspicion of felony agt him, they pray that the 
Ct o'd him to be kept confined 'till the next Term." 
140. Hearings, pt. 1, at 38. 
141. See notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text. 
142. Address of Chief Justice Warren to Annual Meeting of the American Law 
Institute, May 20, 1964, in 35 F.R.D. 181, 189 (1964). The Chief Justice added: "These 
proposals will indeed require a great deal of study, but there can be no doubt that 
to the extent their objectives can be realized, the process of criminal proceedings will 
be fairer than it is now or has been in the past." 
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So long as one third of the committing magistrates were not 
lawyers and most defendants were not represented by counsel at 
preliminary hearing such a development was not feasible.143 With 
the appointment of better-qualified magistrates, the courts or the 
rulemaking bodies will be able to require that the hearing be con-
ducted according to the usual rules of evidence.144 There is, how-
ever, no valid reason for conditioning the application of evidentiary 
rules upon the defendant's waiver of his constitutional right to 
indictment. Such a condition is also open to serious constitutional 
doubt.145 
There is a tendency to assume that the principal reason for ob-
jecting to hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing is a desire to 
obtain discovery; if hearsay cannot be used to establish probable 
cause, then the prosecution will be forced to resort to more revealing 
direct testimony, and thus to provide the defense with an oppor-
tunity for cross-examination. It is true that eyewitness testimony 
given at the hearing is a valuable kind of discovery; but eye-
witness testimony also is obviously more reliable than hearsay for 
the purpose of determining probable cause.146 In our view, it is time 
143. The Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery inquired of all 
United States Commissioners as to the kinds of evidence they admit at the preliminary 
hearing. Surprisingly, forty-six per cent of the Commissioners who responded stated 
that they admit only evidence that would be admissible in court. Questionnaire at 
493, This statement must be received with some skepticism, especially since, as the 
Staff Memorandum noted, "by far the largest group of non-lawyer commissioners who 
responded said that they admit only evidence admissible in court." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
144. On March 31, 1969, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States released Proposed Rules of Evidence for the 
United States District Courts and Magistrates (Preliminary Draft). Rule 11-01 makes 
the proposed rules applicable at preliminary hearing before United States Magistrates. 
The Advisory Committee's Note explicitly states that the rules are intended to apply 
to preliminary hearings: 
Nor does the rule exempt preliminary examinations in criminal cases. Au-
thority as to the applicability of the rules of evidence to preliminary examina-
tions has been meager and conflicting, Goldstein, The State and the Accused: 
Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L. J. 1149, ll68, n. 53 
(1960); Comment, Preliminary Hearings on Indictable Offenses in Philadelphia, 
106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 589, 592-593 (1958). Lack of legal training on the part of 
presiding officers has no doubt tended to make application of the rules a prac-
tical impossibility. However, the enhanced standing of magistrates under the 
Federal Magistrates Act, P.L. 90-578, removes this obstacle and is calculated to 
increase the dignity of preliminary examinations. Moreover, compliance with the 
rules of evidence is calculated to render effective the right of the accused to 
cross-examine witnesses and to introduce evidence in his own behalf, under 
Rule 5(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The fundamental differ-
ence from grand jury proceedings is apparent. 
Id. at 254. 
145. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-85 (1968) (maximum penalty 
of life imprisonment instead of death sentence may not constitutionally be conditioned 
upon waiver of right to trial by petit jury); Scott v. United States, No. 20,954, at IO 
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 13, 1969). 
146, See Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Statement of Judges 
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to adopt the reform discussed by Chief Justice Warren and to re-
quire that preliminary hearings be conducted "under the usual rules 
of evidence," except to the extent that these rules are waived by 
consent of the parties. 
In the interest of time, counsel on occasion would presumably 
be willing to have some elements of the alleged offense, such as 
chemical analysis of substances thought to contain narcotics, estab-
lished by hearsay. Moreover, when an immediate hearing is sought, 
necessary evidence may not yet be available. A number of commis-
sioners told the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial 
Machinery that the need for more time to make further investiga-
tions and to obtain additional evidence is among the reasons which 
the government asserts for seeking a continuance in the preliminary 
hearing.147 To alleviate this problem, the government could be al-
lowed to make a proffer of evidence which, for adequate reasons, 
was not available at the time of the hearing-for example, because 
it consisted of documentary proof being sent from elsewhere. If the 
proffered evidence plus the available evidence does not establish 
probable cause, the defendant should be discharged. Otherwise, the 
defendant might agree either to have the proffer treated as evidence 
or to obtain an adjournment of the hearing until the witness could 
be produced. This procedure would both protect the defendant 
from an illegal arrest for investigation and insure that the govern-
ment would not have to release a defendant when probable cause 
against him cannot be established immediately because essential evi-
dence has not yet been received. 
Application of the hearsay rule and the other usual rules 
of evidence to the preliminary hearing is relatively simple. But the 
question of excluding evidence on constitutional grounds raises more 
complex problems. On the one hand, it makes little sense for a 
qualified magistrate to conduct an adversary, judicial hearing and 
then to hold the defendant when the only evidence against him 
has obviously been obtained by unconstitutional means. On the 
other hand, rule 4l(e) provides that motions for the suppression of 
evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure148 are to be made 
McGowan and Leventhal on their reasons for voting to deny rehearing en bane); cf. 
Hearings, pt. 1, at 36 (testimony of F. Archie Meatyard, Jr., U.S. Commissioner, 
Bethesda, Maryland). 
147. Questionnaire at 485; c. Hearings on S. 3,475, at 105 (statement of Prof. Lloyd 
L. Weinreb of Harvard). 
148. Some courts have applied the same procedure to suppression of confessions. 
See 3 c. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 673, at 108 (1969): 
A number of courts have felt that if a motion to suppress is available before 
trial when evidence has allegedly been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
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in district court; and, since suppression may turn upon complex 
constitutional issues, there are grounds for not allowing committing 
magistrates to make a final ruling.149 Unless hearings are mooted, 
resolution of this dilemma will become increasingly urgent as better 
qualified defense counsel and magistrates are involved in the hear-
ings. A solution would be to permit the committing magistrate 
to determine constitutional evidentiary issues only for purposes of 
ruling upon the admissibility of evidence offered before him on the 
issue of probable cause, leaving the defendant to his rule 4l(e) 
remedy if he is held to answer.um But the government should be 
allowed to petition the district court to set aside a discharge order 
based upon exclusion of evidence alleged to be unlawfully obtained. 
C. Result of Magistrate's Finding of No Probable Cause 
The Magistrates Act does not change the existing law under which 
the prosecutor may present a case to the grand jury even though the 
committing magistrate has found no probable cause at the prelim-
inary hearing.151 In order to make preliminary hearing a meaning-
ful screening device, a rule should be adopted providing that the 
prosecutor, as an officer of the court, may not present evidence to a 
grand jury in a case in which the magistrate has found no probable 
cause at the hearing. An exception to this rule should be provided 
ment, there should be a similar procedure available when it is claimed that evi-
dence has been obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly they 
have held that a motion will lie when it is claimed that a confession was illegally 
obtained. 
See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (Supp. Feb. 1969). 
149. The problem was clearly posed to the Subcommittee on Improvements in 
Judicial Machinery by one committing magistrate: 
I am faced with the attempt of the voluntary defender to prove by cross-examina• 
tion at the preliminary hearing that the warrant was issued without probable 
cause (by showing that the agent did not actually know what the complaint al-
leged), or, more important, that the arrest was illegal and without probable cause. 
Up until now, I have allowed defense counsel to cross-examine on these matters, 
but one of the enforcement agencies has seen fit to complain to the Court, and I 
have been advised by the Court that I have no right to rule on these questions 
since they must be decided by the Judges of the District Court under Rule 41. 
This, in my opinion, results in a great injustice, especially where it is clear 
from tl1e evidence before me that the warrant was illegally issued and/or that the 
defendant was illegally arrested, and hence all the evidence following the arrest is 
inadmissible, especially where admissions or confessions were obtained without 
affording the defendant an opportunity to consult counsel. 
Why should a defendant have to seek bail, be indicted, and probably be com-
mitted and wait months for a motion to be filed in Court after the indictment, or 
at trial, in cases like this? 
Questionnaire 492. 
150. Implementation of this proposal might require a revision of rule 4l(e); see 
3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 148, at 105: "[U]nder the rule [41(e)] the motion must be 
made before the court while before adoption of the rule it could be made to a 
United States commissioner." See also Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). 
151. Some commissioners responding to the questionnaire expressed dissatisfaction 
with the practice. Questionnaire 491. 
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for instances in which the prosecutor obtains leave of court to seek 
an indictment upon a showing that the magistrate erred.152 Once the 
government has chosen to follow the path of pre-indictment arrest 
and preliminary hearing, the prosecutor should not be permitted to 
make a mockery of that proceeding by seeking an indictment from 
the grand jury in disregard of the magistrate's ruling.153 
D. Depositions for Discovery 
The foregoing proposals would all retain or increase the amount 
of discovery now effectively available at the preliminary hearing. 
But even if all of them were adopted, discovery at preliminary hear-
ings would, as the legislators pointed out,154 be haphazard. On the 
other hand, if discovery at the preliminary hearing is reduced, either 
because hearings are consistently mooted or because magistrates 
terminate the proceedings as soon as probable cause is established, 
then a uniquely valuable discovery tool will have been lost. In 
either event, it is time that testimonial discovery in criminal cases 
was extended on a more rational basis. Liberalization of the rules 
governing the availability of grand jury minutes, Jencks Act155 state-
152. The federal grand jury would retain the power to indict on its own initiative, 
but absent prosecutorial urging, such action is rare. See generally Hauberg v. Cox, 
342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 381 U.S. 935 (1965). Cf. Hearings on S. 3,475, at 
140 (testimony of Professor Samuel Dash of Georgetown University). The witness ad-
vocated the adoption of the Pennsylvania ·practice of assuring the right to a prelimi-
nary hearing prior to the presentation of the case to the grand jury. See also 
Symposium-Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 69 (1964) (remarks 
of Professor Frank J. Remington of the University of Wisconsin): 
[I]n Wisconsin there is a right to a preliminary examination which cannot be 
denied the defendant by resort to the grand jury. As a consequence, any defen-
dant who requests a preliminary examination can get one. It is typically true that 
the prosecution is required to put in much, if not all, of its case in order to 
insure a finding of probable cause to hold a defendant for trial ••.. If the defen-
dant has waived a preliminary examination, appears for arraignment and requests 
assigned counsel, a statute in ·w·isconsin provides that he has a right to have the 
case remanded for a preliminary examination. 
153. In light of skepticism concerning the adequacy of the grand jury's screening of 
probable cause, it may also be time to review the extent to which the prosecutor should 
have discretion to seek an original indictment without the prior issuance of a com-
plaint, upon which a rule 5(c) hearing would be held to determine probable cause. 
In the District of Columbia, defendants are sometimes arrested on one charge, as to 
which probable cause is found at preliminary hearing, and subsequently indicted on 
others, the events in which may have occurred earlier. See Godfrey v. United States, 
353 F.2d 456, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Hearings, pt. 3, at 279 (remarks of Dean A. Kenneth 
Pye of Duke Law School); note 86 supra. Rather than allow the prosecutor to exercise 
unfettered discretion as to whether to proceed by rule 5 or rule 9, it would be 
preferable to delineate the kinds of cases as to which an original indictment is particu-
larly appropriate (for example, income tax, antitrust and regulatory crimes, when the 
defendant will often know the evidentiary basis for the indictment because it comes 
largely from his own records). Alternatively, the prosecutor might be required to 
obtain special leave of the district court, explaining the need for obtaining an original 
indictment in an individual case. 
154. See notes 127-29 supra and accompanying text. 
155. For a discussion of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964), and its application 
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ments, and other ·written material will not provide an effective sub-
stitute for preliminary hearing discovery. All of them lack the ad-
vantage of direct confrontation and of having witnesses under oath 
and subject to cross-examination.156 In our view, only the adoption 
of deposition procedures, analogous to those that have long been 
available in federal civil proceedings,157 would afford adequate and 
consistent discovery in criminal cases. 
The proposal for allowing depositions in criminal cases is by no 
means new, 158 but it seems to be gaining somewhat broader accep-
tance at present. At least limited support was recently provided by a 
Task Force of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice: 
It is undesirable to confine the use of depositions only to the 
preservation of testimony of witnesses who may be unavailable at 
trial. Depositions may be used to find facts as well as to preserve testi-
mony. A deposition could resolve a factual dispute during the nego-
tiating stage, and it could provide the basis for a stipulation of wit-
nesses' testimony at trial. In cases where it is not necessary to conduct 
a full preliminary hearing before a judge, depositions may be sub-
mitted to the court for determination of probable cause.159 
Although only a handful of states have provisions permitting the use 
of depositions in criminal cases, 160 their use is becoming less uncom-
mon.101 
The Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Ma-
chinery was in a unique position to explore the potentialities of the 
deposition and other discovery mechanisms with the numerous ex-
pert witnesses who testified before it,162 but it failed to take advan-
to a specific discovery problem, see Recent Development, Criminal Procedure-Evidence 
-Composite Drawing Not Producible Under Jencks Act, 66 MICH. L. REv. 772 (1968). 
156. See note 40 supra and text accompan}ing note 52 supra. 
157. For recent developments in civil discovery and deposition rules, see Prelim-
inary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United 
States Courts Relating to Deposition and Discovery, 43 F.R.D. 215 (1967). 
158. See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal 
Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1150, 1192-98 (1960). 
159. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 
TASK FORCE REPORT! THE COURTS 43 (1967). 
160. Id. 
161. For discussion of recent developments, see Ratnoff, The New Criminal Deposi-
tion Statute in Ohio-Help or Hindrance to Justice?, 19 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 279; 
(1968); Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732 (1967); 
Note, Florida's Proposed Rules of Criminal DiscoveT)'-A New Chapter in Criminal 
Procedure, 19 U. FLA. L. REv. 68 (1966); Thode, Arraignment, Pretrial Hearing and 
Discovery, Oct. 13, 1966 (mimeographed address to Institute on Texas and Federal 
Criminal Procedure, University of Texas School of Law). 
162. Lawrence Speiser, Director of the "\Vashington office of the American Civil 
Liberties Union stressed the value of discovery in criminal, as in civil, cases. Hearings, 
pt. 3, at 215. 
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tage of this opportunity. There are many features requiring careful 
consideration. For example, to what extent could discovery be made 
reciprocal, within constitutional bounds?163 Would it be adequate 
to allow depositions to be taken before any person qualified to ad-
minister oaths, or is there sufficient difference from civil cases to 
require that criminal discovery take place before a judicial officer 
with some authority to protect witnesses? It may well be that judicial 
control of depositions is needed, since there is a real possibility that 
a witness called to testify at the deposition might incriminate him-
self. Rather than entrust this responsibility to one of the two counsel 
present, neither of whose interests may coincide with the witness', it 
might be preferable to require the presence of a judicial officer pos-
sessing the authority to appoint counsel for a witness who needs it. 
Similarly, there may be stronger reasons to object to the form or 
content of questions in depositions in criminal cases than in civil. 
Once again, having a judicial officer available to make a ruling on 
the spot would serve a useful purpose. In fact, the newly created 
federal magistrates might themselves be given such a task. Section 
101 of the Federal Magistrates Act provides that the district court 
may establish rules pursuant to which ... any full-time United States 
magistrate, or . . . any part-time magistrate specially designated by 
the court, may be assigned ... additional duties .... The additional 
duties authorized by rule may include, but are not restricted to-
(2) assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or dis-
covery proceedings in civil or criminal actions .... 164 
In short, the Federal Magistrates Act can serve to further rather 
than to retard criminal discovery. The Supreme Court, through its 
rule-making authority, or the district courts through theirs,165 should 
act to fill the potential void in discovery arising out of the Act's 
preliminary hearing provisions, and advantage should be taken of 
the express availability of the federal magistrates whom the Act pro-
vides to conduct pretrial discovery proceedings. 
163. The problem already exists under Fm. R. CRIM. P. 16(c). See Discovery in 
Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 482 (1968) (panel discussion before Judicial Conference 
of the Second Circuit, Sept. 8, 1967). See also Symposium, Discovery in Federal Criminal 
Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 63-64 (1963) (remarks of Justice Brennan). 
Reciprocity in discovery has been widely urged. See, e.g., Washington Post, May 11, 
1967, at Bl (proposal by a Maryland state's attorney to Prince George's County Bar 
Association); Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1966, at B6 (remarks of Judge Leventhal to 
District of Columbia Bar Association's junior section); Discovery in Criminal Cases, 
44 F.R.D. 498-99 (1968) (statement by U.S. Attorney for Connecticut). 
164. 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b) (Supp. Feb. 1969). 
165. See FED. R. CRI~r. P. 57(a), which authorizes district courts to make rules 
for the conduct of criminal proceedings so long as they are not inconsistent with the 
statutes or rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. 
